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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH - FEDERAL COM-
MUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (D.C. Cir. 1967)
In November 1964, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. presented The
Christian Crusade, one of a series of radio programs which featured Rev.
Billy James Hargis. During the course of the broadcast Rev. Hargis
discussed a book entitled Goldwater - Extremist of the Right, and accused
its author, Fred J. Cook, of having been discharged by the New York
World Telegram for making unfounded televised accusations against a
city official. Red Lion, in violation of the requirements of the Federal
Communications Commission's fairness doctrine,' failed to send a tran-
script of the program to Mr. Cook or to offer him free time to reply.2
Consequently, in response to Cook's complaint, the FCC ordered Red Lion
to comply. After extended negotiation between the FCC and Red Lion
failed to produce a mutually acceptable solution, the broadcasting station
challenged the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In rejecting
petitioners' broad-based attack on the doctrine, the court held that it
violates neither the first, fifth, ninth, nor tenth amendments. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967) (No. 600).
During the formative stage of the radio industry it became apparent
that government regulation would be needed to facilitate the distribution
of the limited number of available broadcast frequencies among the myriad
of potential entrepreneurs. Consequently, Congress, through the Com-
munications Act of 1934, 3 created the Federal Communications Com-
mission 4 to regulate the broadcasting industry in the "public interest," 5
1. The fairness doctrine as it exists today is enunciated in 25 P & F RADIO REG.
1899 (1963), and 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964) (hereinafter cited as the Fairness
Primer). For a development of the rule in the decisions of the FCC, see Barron, The
Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 Gto.
WASH. L. Rgv. 1, 1-7 (1961).
2. The fairness doctrine requires that one attacked in his "honesty, character,
integrity or like personal qualities" be provided with both a transcript of the program
and free time to reply. 25 P & F RADIO REG. 1899, 1900 (1963) ; Fairness Primer
10420-21. See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1252 (1949)
(hereinafter cited as the Editorializing Report).
3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1964).
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and authorized the Commission to grant licenses to private enterprisers
who were to act as public trustees in their use of the airwaves. 6
Since direct access to the microphone was limited by the strictures
of federal licensing, and by the finite spectrum of the broadcasting band,
it was clear that provisions would have to be enacted to guarantee that
the licensees did not stifle opinions opposed to their own. 7 Thus, the Radio
Act of 19278 and the Communications Act of 19349 included the require-
ment that stations allot equal time to opposing political candidates. How-
ever, this provision was not a panacea, for the licensees could still effec-
tively control opinion during non-election periods. As a consequence, the
Federal Radio Commission, 10 and later the FCC," denied applications
for licenses from those who would, or did, employ their facilities to ex-
pound but one view.
The genesis of the current fairness doctrine can be found in the 1941
FCC opinion, Mayflower Broadcasting Corp.,12 where the Commission
ruled that if a controversial topic of public importance were aired, the
licensee would be required to present all shades of opinion on that topic.
This position was taken a step further in the 1949 Editorializing Report,'3
where the Commissioners, for the first time, placed on the broadcasters
an affirmative duty to seek out those various shades of opinion. The
doctrine attained its current stature in 1959 when Congress amended sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act of 193414 so as to sanction what
previously had been merely an administrative ruling.15
The facts of the instant case specifically concern one aspect of this
broad doctrine; the obligation to offer anyone who has been personally
6. Editorializing Report 1247. Earlier attempts to regulate broadcasting throughlicensing schemes were made by Congress in the act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat.302 and the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
7. There is not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought, religious,political, social, and economic, each to have its separate broadcasting station, its
mouthpiece in the ether. If franchises are extended to some it gives them unfair
advantage over others....
Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 34(1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930) as quoted in Fairness
Primer 10426.
Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. This
is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression,
it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some
who wish to use it must be denied.
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
8. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
10. Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Chicago Fed'n of Labor v. FRC, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 36(1929), aff'd, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ; Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC,3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
11. Laurence W. Harry, 13 F.C.C. 23 (1948); WBNX Broadcasting Co., 12
F.C.C. 805 (1948) ; Robert Harold Scott, 11 F.C.C. 372 (1946) ; United Broadcasting
Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945) ; Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941);
Young Peoples Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
12. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
13. See note 2 supra.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
15. Equal Time Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
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attacked free time to respond. 16 However, since both the arguments of
petitioners and the counter-arguments of the Commission, as well as the
reasoning of the court, are general in scope, it is the entire fairness doctrine
which ultimately receives the approval of the court.
Red Lion's constitutional attack on the doctrine was multifaceted.
In addition to alleging first amendment violations, it maintained that
Congress had improperly delegated its authority,17 and that, in violation
of the fifth amendment, saleable airtime had been taken without due
process of law.' It also urged that the doctrine violated the ninth and
tenth amendments in that it usurped rights retained by the people and
powers reserved to the states.19 Since the overwhelming weight of au-
thority is opposed to these latter contentions, this note will be limited to
the first amendment problems that were raised.
Before considering the freedom of speech problems, several pre-
liminary points should be noted. First, due to the unique technological
limitations inherent in broadcasting, the air waves, unlike other modes of
expression, are appropriately suited for government regulation, and this
regulation has, on many occasions, withstood the attack that it is a per se
violation of the first amendment.2 0 Secondly, the broadcaster has, despite
this regulation, a broad area in which he may say as he pleases. He has,
for example, wide programming discretion, limited only by what is reason-
ably within the public interest.21 Therefore, even under the fairness doc-
16. Note 2 supra.
17. On petitioners' allegation, based on Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 514 (1964), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), that 47 U.S.C.§ 315 (1964), as amended, is not precise enough to pass constitutional muster, the
court found that Congress had met the requirements of Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944), by dictating a legislative objective and reasonably concise
and specifically enumerated standards to guide the commission in its administrative
determination. In point of fact, numerous cases have held the legislative standard of
serving the "public interest, convenience and necessity" to be a valid basis for the
grant of legislative authority. See FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 89-91
(1953); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943); FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940) ; Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) ; New York Cent. Sec. Corp.
v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932).
18. Having found the necessary precision in the delegation of authority, peti-
tioners' argument that the statute was so vague as to be violative of due process
also fell. Red Lion's further contention that it had been denied due process because
the charges of Rev. Hargis were not first ascertained to be false was summarily
dismissed. The policy of free speech would be nullified if it could be exercised only
by those with the "right" viewpoint. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
19. These objections have a threshold weakness in that the courts have already
found congressional power to regulate broadcasting in the commerce clause. See
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1942); Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d
183, 189 (3d Cir. 1938).
20. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943) ; Idaho Microwave, Inc. v.
FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC,
321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963) ; Henry v. FCC, 302
F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); Johnston Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. FCC, 171 F.2d
826 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 846 (1948).
21. Regents of New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts v.
Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F.2d 900, 906 (10th Cir. 1947). See Commis-
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trine, he is completely free to raise any issue of public importance,22 pro-
vided that he does not stifle the opinions of others. Whether this prohi-
bition and the regulations that stem from it constitute a prior restraint
on the broadcaster's freedom of speech or merely reasonable burdens
imposed upon a public "trustee" as a means of protecting the interests
of his "beneficiaries" is the real issue to be decided.
In essence, Red Lion contended that the fear of losing its license
because of a violation of the fairness doctrine restrained it from voicing
an opinion, or allowing its paying customers to speak, on public issues.
It was further urged that the petitioners were forced to surrender their
right of free speech as a condition to obtaining a license.23
In regard to the petitioners' contention that the doctrine imposes a
prior restraint on its freedom of speech, the court reiterated that the
licensees have wide programming discretion, 24 that there is no requirement
to submit any material to any agency before airing it, and that the FCC
is expressly forbidden to be a censor.25 Addressing itself to the licensing
scheme, the court found that the petitioners were not compelled to forfeit
their right to speak on public issues as a condition to obtaining the license.
The considerations of the public interest, convenience, and necessity are the
only existing standards of eligibility for a license. Furthermore, because
of technological limitations, the fairness doctrine is essential if those con-
siderations are to be advanced. It was also felt that in the light of the pro-
tections of the Administrative Procedure Act,26 accessibility to the courts,
full access to the pertinent regulations, 27 and the FCC policy that no
broadcaster shall lose his license for an honest mistake in judgment, the
petitioner's de facto fear of loss of its license through capricious admin-
istrative action was unreasonable.
The conclusion of the court that no prior restraint exists and that
there is therefore no first amendment violation, is justifiable. This is
certainly not the classic prior restraint situation.28 The problem is not
one of dealing with newspapers, which, in every real sense, own their own
medium, but with broadcasters who must obtain a license to use the
public airwaves. Nor is there a throttling of the medium; rather, the
situation is that once the medium speaks, it cannot stifle others. It is true
that in this situation, as in the classic newspaper cases, the attacked
victim has access to other modes of communication (e.g., leaflets) to get
his message across; however, it cannot be forgotten that these other media
22. The FCC enunciated the freedom which broadcasters have with respect to
public issues in Editorializing Report 1250-51. They are even permitted to editorialize
within reasonable limits, subject to the general requirements of fairness detailed by
the report. Id. at 1252-56.
23. Compare the views of Commissioner Jones in the Editorializing Report 1264.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964).
26. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
27. The pertinent regulations are reported in 25 P & F RADIO Rc. 1899 (1963),
and in the Fairness Primer.
28. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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are not as effective as broadcasting in reaching the public's ear, and it is
the public's right to hear all sides of important issues that is paramount.
It is felt that the policy of free speech would be emasculated rather than
strengthened by any other decision. 29
The conclusion that the requirements of the fairness doctrine are
nothing more than reasonable burdens imposed upon a licensee when he
obtains the privilege to use the public airwaves is buttressed by the follow-
ing reasoning: Congress, in response to the obvious need to allocate the
limited resource of the broadcast band, in a legitimate exercise of its power
over commerce,30 appropriated the band for the public use and designated
the licensees public "trustees. 1 This appropriation and designation, in
turn, is necessitated by the conviction that, in order to realize an effective
self-governing society, the public must be fully exposed to all sides of
public controversies. 32 Therefore, the licensees, when beaming discussions
of public issues to their "beneficiaries," must be required to present all
sides fairly and openly.
The court could have ended its analysis by recognizing the right of
the public to hear, but it did not. By acknowledging that the fairness doc-
trine "recognizes and enforces the free speech right of the victim of any
personal attack,"33 it also upheld the offended individual's right to speak.
It should be noted that, unlike the rest of the opinion which applies
to the entire fairness doctrine, the court's recognition of the victim's
right to answer charges levied against him in a personal attack applies
specifically to that one facet of the doctrine. Indeed, except in the case
of a personal attack, the broadcaster is allowed wide discretion in choosing
spokesmen for opposing viewpoints.34 Therefore, this particular portion
of the holding does not encroach upon the broadcaster's discretion, absent
a personal attack, and a right to speak is not granted to everyone who
disagrees with a viewpoint aired by the licensee in question.
29. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Editorializing
Report 1248.
It would be strange indeed however if the grave concern for freedom of the
press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a
command that the government was without power to protect that freedom ...
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose
restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish
means freedom for all and not for some.
326 U.S. at 20.
It has been urged that the press, while not as technologically limited as the
broadcaster media, is limited by practical economic limitations which are just as real.
The declining number of American daily newspapers due to rising costs suggests
that the same policy which necessitates imposing the fairness doctrine on broadcasters,
compels such a doctrine on the press. See Barron, Access to the Press - A New
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. R~v. 1641 n.36 (1967), and sources cited therein
for a discussion of the declining newspaper industry.
30. See notes 17-19 supra.
31. Editorializing Report 1247.
32. Id. at 1249. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ; Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1939).
33. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 924 (1967).
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The essence of the victim's recognized right to answer is, however,
remarkably difficult to pin down. The expression of the court which
characterizes the prerogative as a "free speech right" clearly establishes
that it is more than a privilege;85 however, it is not clear whether this
"right" evolves from the first amendment or from the inherent techno-
logical limitations of the broadcast industry which require that facilities
be concentrated in the hands of a few. This distinction is important, for
if the right to access is limited to situations where the means of com-
munication are, because of technological limitations, controlled by a rela-
tively small group, the most expansive ramification of this holding would
be the judicial acceptance of those arguments which call for its application
to the entire press because of the economic limitations on the number of
publications. 6  However, if this access right emanates from the first
amendment, it lends support to those who argue that the courts should
creatively construe the entire Bill of Rights so as to protect the public
not only from the encroachments of the government but also from the
improprieties of the large monolithic "private governments" - the labor
unions, corporations, associations - which have flourished in the modern
economy. 7 While the court did not specify the source of this right to
respond, thus allowing for varied interpretations, both the tone of the
opinion and the absence of reference to the first amendment as the well-
spring of the right indicate that its decision was motivated by the peculiar
problems of the broadcast industry8 8 rather than by proscriptions of the
first amendment.
But even if the court meant to say that the injured party actually
had a first amendment right to speak, one theory on the constitutionality
of the fairness doctrine would recognize this right and still be consistent
with the proposition that the amendment only protects against the govern-
ment and not private entrepreneurs. The actions of the broadcasters are
given, through the licensing and renewal process, the authorization and
ratification of the government. Since they are the "agents" of the govern-
ment, their violation of the individual's right to speak will be imputed
to the government as their "principal." Because the government cannot
35. See Editorializing Report 1258 (additional views of Commissioner Webster).
36. Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
Rtv. 1641 (1967) ; Donnelly, Government and Freedom of the Press, 45 ILL. L. Rv.
31, 56 (1950) ; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 902 (1963). Although the newspapers similarly are in the hands of a few,
the question arises as to whether the economic factors limiting their number are of
the same substance as the purely technological limitations restricting the number of
broadcasters. If there is a qualitative difference between relative economic limitations
and absolute technological restrictions, the theory that the press should also be subject
to a fairness doctrine would fall.
37. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broad-
casting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLORADO L. Rzv. 31, 44-45 (1964) ; Miller, The
Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. Rlv. 620, 655-56 (1959).
38. The entire question of the victim's right to answer may be nothing more than
dicta, since recognizing the victim's right to speak is in no way necessary for a
determination of whether the broadcaster's first amendment right was violated. See
Judge Fahy concurring in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 930
(D.C. Cir. 1967). 6
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do through its "agents" what it is forbidden to do directly, the fairness
doctrine will protect the individual's first amendment rights against en-
croachment by government licensees. 39
In order to appreciate the full effect of the court's upholding the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in its entirety, it should be noted
that last year the same court, for the first time, in Office of Communica-
ion of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,40 conferred standing on the
representatives of the listening public to intervene as parties in a license
renewal case. This ruling also gives such representatives access to the
courts to appeal adverse decisions of the FCC. Since parties with a very
real interest can now utilize the newly court-approved fairness doctrine,
the doctrine, which has not as a practical matter been completely effective
in the past,41 promises to be a much more significant force in the future.4"
Joseph R. Wenk
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TAXATION - NONDISCRIMINATORY
STATE SALES AND USE TAX ON NATIONAL BANK UPHELD NOT-
WITHSTANDING LACK OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION.
First Agricultural Natl Bank v. Tax Comm'n (Mass. 1967)
Plaintiff, a Massachusetts national bank organized under an act of
Congress,' requested a ruling or an emergency regulation from the State
Tax Commission that national banks are exempt from the Massachusetts
sales and use tax.2 Subsequently, the Commission issued an emergency
regulation which stated that "[t]he sale, lease, or rental of tangible per-
39. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broad-
casting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLORADO L. REv. 31, 43-44 (1964). For analogous
cases in the racial discrimination area, see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967),
noted in 13 VILL. L. Rtv. 199 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
If this conceptual approach were adopted, a question would arise as to whether
the licensees, as "quasi-governmental agencies," would also be subject to other limita-
tions imposed on the government by the Bill of Rights. For example, an argument
could be made that under the establishment clause the licensees should be prohibited
from broadcasting religious programs.
40. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), noted in 31 ALBANY L. Ruv. 133 (1967),
16 AM. U.L. REv. 102 (1966) and 80 HARV. L. Rv. 670 (1967).
41. See Friedenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political
Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HARV. L. Rpv. 445 (1959).
42. See, e.g., FCC Upholds Decision on Giving Antismokers Air Time for
Opinions, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 11, 1967, at 32, col. 6 .
1. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1964) (corresponds to National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106,§ 5, 13 Stat. 100).
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sonal property to national banks ... is subject to the sales and use tax."'3
Plaintiff thereupon filed a bill seeking a binding declaration 4 that it is
exempt from the sales and use tax. The trial court heard the case but
reserved decision for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which
held that national banks do not have either a constitutional or federal
statutory immunity from a nondiscriminatory state sales 5 and use tax.6
First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n -.....Mass -..... ,229 N.E.2d
245 (1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3180 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1967)
(No. 755).
From the time that M'Culloch v. Maryland 7 and the later case of
Osborn v. United States8 were decided, the implied constitutional im-
munity of national banks from state taxation has not been seriously ques-
tioned. In M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall, after deciding that national
banks were a "necessary and proper" means of implementing the federal
power over the monetary and fiscal policy of the United States, 9 held that
a Maryland statute which imposed a discriminatory tax on the notes of
the Second National Bank was repugnant to the federal statute which
chartered the bank and was therefore constitutionally void because of the
"supremacy clause."'10 In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall reiterated the
M'Culloch rationale, and found no merit to the contention that the pro-
prietary operations of national banks should not be protected from state
taxation." In 1864, Congress, in passing section 41 of the National Bank
3. The emergency regulation further stated: "National banks and Federal savings
and loan associations making sales of tangible personal property must collect the salestax to the same extent as other vendors making such sales." First Agricultural Nat'l
Bank v. Tax Comm'n -.... Mass - ------- 229 N.E.2d 245, 247 & n.1 (1967).
4. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 7 (1966) authorizes declaratory relief.5. The Massachusetts court determined that the legal incidence of the sales tax
was upon the vendor and, employing the test enunciated in James v. Dravo ContractingCo., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), and Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), held that
no implied constitutional immunity could be interposed to protect the national banksfrom the economic burden of the Massachusetts sales tax. On appeal to the SupremeCourt this determination by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that the legalincidence of the sales tax is on the vendor, is not subject to review. See Federal Land
Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99 (1941), where the court stated:
"These determinations of the incidence of the tax by the state court are controlling,
and respondents concede the point."
6. The court was also faced with construing exemption sections of the Sales
and Use Tax Act which excluded "agencies" of the United States from the act's
operation. The court concluded that the state legislature did not intend that national
banks should come within the purview of the "agency" exemption in holding: "Atbest, the plaintiff [national bank] is a creature of the United States and not entitled
to an exemption as an agency of the United States ...... Mass. at .....-, 229 N.E.2d
at 248. (emphasis added).
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424.
10. Id. at 436. Chief Justice Marshall said:
The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The
result is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitu-
tional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the
general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the constitution has declared.
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 861-68 (1824).
[VOL. 13
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Act,12 granted the states the right to tax the real estate of national banks
and the capital stock of national banks in the hands of their stockholders,
provided the other moneyed capital within the state was taxed in the same
manner. After this enactment the majority of cases decided by the Su-
preme Court in the area of state taxation of national banks have been
concerned with interpreting its provisions. 13 Owensboro Nat'l Bank v.
Owensboro,*4 which struck down a nondiscriminatory state franchise
tax as it applied to national banks, foreclosed resort by the states to any
method of taxing national banks other than those prescribed by section
41 when the Court held that "[a] ny state tax therefore which is in excess
of and not in conformity to these requirements [section 41] is void."'15
In contravening the holdings of the M'Culloch and Osborn cases, the
First Agricultural court did not explicitly direct its attention to either
the necessary and proper or the supremacy aspects of Chief Justice Mar-
shall's rationale. Rather, the court enunciated a standard which would
subject federally created instrumentalities to a nondiscriminatory state
tax when the instrumentalities are privately owned, profit-oriented corpo-
rations performing essentially proprietary functions.
Whether the governmental - proprietary 16 aspect of the court's test
can be sustained depends upon the constitutional ramifications of segre-
gating the operations of a federally created instrumentality into these
categories. The significance of this dichotomy was discussed at some
length by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn where he decided that the
private operations of a national bank could not be separated from its
governmental functions, for Congress, in granting national banks the
authority to participate in private profit-making activities, created a method
of engrafting life upon the skeleton which it had created.17 Furthermore,
12. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 111, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548(1964).
13. E.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961) ; Colorado Nat'l
Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 (1940) ; Tradesmen Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 309
U.S. 560 (1940) ; Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 209 (1936) ; Iowa-
Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Hart-
ford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927) ; Bank of Calif. v. Richardson, 248 U.S. 476 (1919)
National Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U.S. 60 (1888).
14. 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
15. Id. at 669.
16. The test established by the Massachusetts court has all the characteristics of
the test established in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), where
the Supreme Court upheld the state-controlled liquor agencies' susceptibility to federal
taxation by distinguishing these agencies as being usually proprietary as opposed to
other state agencies which are usually, or historically, governmental in character and
which are immune from federal taxation. In the later case of New York v. UnitedStates, 326 U.S. 572, 584 (1946), Justice Frankfurter, after discussing problems which
arise in applying this governmental-proprietary test, adopted a test which placed "no
restriction upon Congress to include the States in levying a tax exacted equally from
private persons upon the same subject matter." For a discussion of the propriety of
state 'taxation of federal instrumentalities on the sole basis of reciprocity see Note,
State Taxation of Federal Instrumentalities: The Converse of South Carolina v.
United States, 49 HARV. L. R~v. 1323 (1936).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 861-62. Chief Justice Marshall said:
It [lending and dealing in money] is, . . . the vital part of the corporation; it is
its soul; and the right to preserve it originates in the same principle with the
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as long as these activities of lending and dealing in money were "so essen-
tial to the fiscal operations of the government, as to authorize Congress
to confer them," then "the right to preserve them [must] exist .... ,,i8
If, however, these activities are not essential to the fiscal operations of the
federal government, then "there will be much difficulty in sustaining that
essential part of the charter."' 19
The difficulty to which Chief Justice Marshall referred stems from
the rationale of the constitutionally implied immunity of national banks
from state taxation. Basically, that rationale is that national banks are
accorded immunity from state taxation because their creation, as necessary
and proper federal instrumentalities, placed them within the ambit of the
federal sovereign and, as the federal sovereign is supreme in relation to
the state sovereign in areas where their respective sovereignties conflict,
a grant of power to the states to tax the federal sovereign would under-
mine the concept of federal supremacy.20 Therefore, it seems clear that if
the governmental-proprietary test of taxability as set forth in the instant
case is to be sustained, an attack on the reasoning in M'Culloch must
proceed in either of the following ways: (1) national banks are no longer
necessary and proper to implement the federal fiscal and monetary policy,
or, (2) the absolute prohibition of direct state taxation is no longer a
necessary standard for protecting the supremacy of the federal sovereign.
The First Agricultural court did not expressly hold that national
banks are no longer a necessary and proper instrumentality of the federal
government. The court did, however, place a great deal of emphasis on the
growth in the proprietary functions of national banks and on the cor-
responding shift in duty to maintain a system of currency and currency
control from national banks to the Federal Reserve System.21 However,
to rely on this shift as a basis for undermining the power of Congress
to create, maintain, and control national banks is not to recognize the
vital part which national banks play in the Federal Reserve System. The
Federal Reserve System currently maintains control over the amount of
money in circulation and the credit available for commercial transactions,
primarily by establishing reserve requirements for time deposits held by its
member banks.22 Because national banks are required to be members of
the Federal Reserve System, 23 they become the primary instrumentalities
through which the Federal Reserve System operates to control the mone-
18. Id. at 864.
19. Id. at 861.
20. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
21. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n- ..... Mass --------..... . 229
N.E.2d 245, 255 (1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3180 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1967)(No. 755). See also Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48 (1940) ; Pious
& Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland - Right Principle, Wrong Case, 9 STrAN. L. Rev.
710, 720-21 (1957).
22. See BOARD or GOVERNORS or THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOStS AND FUNCTIONS 13-30 (4th ed. 1961).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1964).
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tary and fiscal policy of the United States. 24 In light of the integral
relationship between the national banking system and the Federal Reserve
System, it is understandable that the Massachusetts court did not ex-
pressly hold that national banks are no longer a necessary and proper
exercise of federal power.25
Although it is not entirely clear that the First Agricultural court was
directing an attack at the current propriety of the absolute prohibition of
state taxation as the standard for protecting the supremacy of the federal
sovereignty, it is clear that the court has made cogent observations that
tend to support a reevaluation of this standard. Initially, the court ob-
served that the Massachusetts use tax is not a discriminatory state tax
which will either destroy or effectively control the national banking sys-
tem, as was the situation faced by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch.26
The sole purpose of imposing this use tax on national banks as well as
state banks is to create an equal burden upon those corporations which
seek and receive "the benefits of State and local services, the protection
of the laws of the State, access to its courts, and the patronage of its
citizens. ' 27 Furthermore, the court observed that there are no current
dissimilarities in the operations of national banks and state banks which
justify the inequity of taxation which this absolute prohibition creates. 28
The only purpose served by such a standard is the elevation of national
banks to a superior competitive position in the commercial banking
market.29 Finally, the burden of this tax will not be incurred by the
federal treasury, but instead will be reflected in a reduction in the
profits of the privately owned national banks.
If there is an area where state taxation of federal instrumentalities
should be allowed to coincide with federal power, the Supreme Court
has not so indicated. There are, however, cases which indicate that the
Court is not adverse to state taxation which imposes the economic burden
of the tax on the federal government or its instrumentalities as long as
the legal incidence is on another. 30 Other cases indicate that the Court is
not hostile to the establishment of a taxing parity between private corpo-
rations which are under contract with the federal government and those
which are not.8 ' But in none of these cases has the Supreme Court ex-
24. See Barnes v. Anderson Nat'l Bank, 293 Ky. 592, 601, 169 S.W.2d 833, 838
(1943).
25. Practically, the ramifications of such a holding would be incomprehensible.
National banks would be in a hiatus of existence, and seemingly would only be per-
mitted to continue operations upon the approval of the state in which they are located.
26 -......Mass. at ----- ,229 N.E.2d at 252.
27. Id. at . 229 N.E.2d at 258.
28. Id. at , 229 N.E.2d at 256.
29. Id. at ...... 229 N.E.2d at 258.
30. E.g., Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941) ; Alabama v. King & Boozer,
314 U.S. 1 (1941) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
31. E.g., City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958)
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pressly or impliedly held that federal instrumentalities are no longer pro-
tected by an absolute implied constitutional immunity from direct state
taxation. 32 In fact, as recently as 1966, the Supreme Court has observed
that national banks' "status as tax-immune instrumentalities of the United
States is beyond dispute. '33 Thus, even if the test established in the instant
case is more responsive to modern economic realities, the court seemingly
overstepped its authority in redefining heretofore unquestioned principles
of constitutional law.
Another obstacle which faced the Massachusetts court, in addition
to the constitutional problems, was section 548 of the National Bank Act
which states that "[t]he legislature of each State may determine and
direct, subject to the provisions of this section, the manner and place
of taxing all the shares of national banking associations located within
its limits. . .. "34 The court in the instant case placed great reliance on the
fact that no express immunity was granted in this statute, such as ap-
pears in several other similar statutes, 35 and found that absent any implied
constitutional immunity the statute did nothing to control the power of the
states to tax national banks. 36 The correctness of this decision depends
upon whether section 548 carries an implied congressional immunity with-
in itself or whether that implied immunity rests on the continuation of
the constitutionally implied immunity established in M'Culloch. The
Supreme Court,37 and various state courts, 8 when presented with a taxing
controversy involving a state and a national bank, have adopted the posi-
tion that section 548 defines the extent to which a state can tax national
banks. These courts have not, however, considered whether that section
is based on an implied congressional grant of immunity or an implied
constitutional immunity. From the legislative history, it would appear
that in passing section 41 (now section 548) Congress was primarily con-
of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). For an analysis of prior decisions of the Supreme
Court in the area of derivative governmental immunities see Powell, The Waning of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. Rev. 633 (1945).
32. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CASES -
COMMENTS - QUESTIONS 460 (note d) (2d ed. 1967).
33. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 360 (1966).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964) (emphasis added).
35 -...... Mass. at ..... n.23, 229 N.E.2d at 260 n.23.
36. Id. at ---- 229 N.E.2d at 259.
37. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341 (1926) ; Des Moines Nat'l
Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro,
173 U.S. 664 (1899) ; Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896).
38. E.g., Western Lithograph Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d
156, 78 P.2d 731 (1938); National Bank v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 205, 188 N.E.2d 704(1963); National Bank v. Department of Revenue, 340 Mich. 573, 66 N.W.2d 237(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 934 (1955); Federal Reserve Bank v. Department of
Revenue, 339 Mich. 587, 64 N.W.2d 639 (1954) ; Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Buscaglia,
26 App. Div. 2d 97, 270 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1966), appeal docketed, No. 203, New York
Court of Appeals, April 25, 1967; Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Gillis- ..... S.D -.....-
148 N.W.2d 293 (1967).
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cerned with what authority to tax, if any, should be given to the states.3 9
It would appear, therefore, that Congress intended that national banks be
subjected to state taxation only in the ways which were expressly provided
in the statute. Indeed, one commentator has observed that unless the im-
plied immunity of section 548 was a congressional grant of immunity,
rather than a constitutional grant of immunity, serious questions arise
concerning the constitutional power of Congress to enact section 548.40
In 1926, Congress amended section 41 for the purpose of establishing
"a taxing parity" between national banks and "other corporations and
their shareholders."41 When the underlying business problems of the
instant case are examined, 42 it seems apparent that this purpose is no
longer being fulfilled. Thus, if this parity of taxation between national
banks and "other corporations generally and their shareholders" (state
chartered banks) is to be restored by statute, Congress must further
amend section 548.
The court in the instant case has circumvented Congress by removing
the implied constitutional immunity of national banks from state taxation,
thereby establishing the authority of states to directly tax national banks.
Whether this position can be sustained depends on a redefinition of the
standard of protection necessary to maintain federal supremacy. Any
other approach would result in grave doubts as to whether national banks
are still properly created instrumentalities of the federal government.
But, even if the constitutional immunity of national banks from state
taxation is no longer necessary to preserve the supremacy of the federal
sovereign, section 548 may continue to be interpreted as it has been in
prior cases and thereby preclude the states from taxing national banks.
The better avenue is to directly present Congress with sufficient arguments
to persuade that body to amend section 548 to include the state sales and
use tax as an acceptable method of state taxation of national banks.
Thomas C. Riley
39. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1865-66, 1871-74 (1864).
40. See Traynor, National Bank Taxation in California, 17 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 88
(1929), where the author, on commenting upon the basis of state power to tax national
banks, observed:
It is apparent that the theory that the states derive their power to tax national
banks from a grant by Congress cannot be sustained if it means that Congress
has granted a power which is by the Constitution delegated exclusively to the
federal government or prohibited to the states by that instrument.
41. 67 CONG. REC. 6083 (1926) (remarks of Representative McFadden).
42. See Dane, The New Sales and Use Tax Law, 51 MAss. L.Q. 239, 247-48
(1966), where the author observes:
The status of sales to national banks is likely to prove a major bone of contention
since national banks and state banks are in direct competition in many areas,
particularly in the area of supplying computer and data processing services on a
fee basis. If the national banks are entitled to purchase data processing equipment
free of any sales tax burden, their competitive position vis-a-vis their state-
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CUSTODY DECREES - OUT-OF-STATE DECREE RENDERED WITHOUT
PERSONAL SERVICE ON THE MOTHER NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT.
Batchelor v. Fulcher (Ky. 1967)
Appellee, father of the children in question, obtained a divorce and
custody decree in Indiana. The two children were present before the
Indiana court, and the appellant mother was proceeded against by publica-
tion. During a visit to the father in Indiana a year later, the mother re-
moved the children to Kentucky where she instituted her own custody
action, personally serving the father when he came to Kentucky to retake
the children. The Circuit Court of Hopkins County dismissed her action
without a hearing, treating the Indiana decree as conclusive. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed in a five to two decision,
holding that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Consti-
tution' did not bar the circuit court from hearing the case, that the circuit
court had jurisdiction over the parties, and that the welfare of the
children is the determining factor in the award of custody. Batchelor v.
Fulcher, 415 S.W. 2d 828 (Ky. 1967).
The applicability of the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution was squarely presented when the opinion stated quite
clearly that regardless of the validity of the Indiana judgment it should not
be enforced in a child custody case.2 In reaching this conclusion both the
majority and the dissent looked to the United States Supreme Court for
precedent. Significantly, both chose May v. Anderson3 as the point of
departure.
At the time of May, the general rule had been that exclusive of fraud
or lack of jurisdiction a custody award of one state would be recognized
and binding in another state as long as the circumstances which existed
at the time of the decree still obtained. 4 In May, the mother, living with
her husband and children in Wisconsin, took the children to Ohio and
decided not to return. The father successfully sued for divorce and cus-
tody of the children in Wisconsin, having served the mother personally
in Ohio with a copy of the Wisconsin summons and petition in accordance
with Wisconsin divorce proceeding requirements. When the father at-
tempted to have the Wisconsin custody decree enforced in Ohio, the
1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2. Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Ky. 1967).
3. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
4. See, e.g., Minick v. Minick, Ill Fla. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Wear v. Wear,
130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930); Talbot v. Talbot, 120 Mont. 167, 181 P.2d 148(1947) ; Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 P. 918 (1914) ; Kenner v. Kenner, 139Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1918). See generallv R. LtFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 180,
at 348 (1959) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 454 (1950) ; 49 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 400 (1954)
47 Nw. U.L. Rgv. 544 n.4 (1952).
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United States Supreme Court held that even if the technical domicile
of the children were with the father, the Wisconsin court did not have
the requisite personal jurisdiction to deprive the mother of her right to
the immediate possession of the children.5 The decision is extremely am-
biguous, however, on a number of bases.
As the dissent in Batchelor points out,6 the majority opinion in May
is written by Mr. Justice Burton and concurred in by three other justices.
Justices Jackson, Reed, and Minton dissented, and Mr. Justice Clark took
no part in the case. Therefore, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate con-
curring opinion 7 should be examined to see if it supports the majority's
reasoning on the apparent inapplicability of the full faith and credit clause.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw the majority as deciding that the full faith
and credit clause did not require Ohio to recognize the Wiconsin decree.
But he did not read the majority opinion, as he thought the minority did,
to hold that the due process clause forbade the Ohio court to recognize the
Wisconsin decree. The majority, however, decided that a court of a state
where the mother is neither domiciled, present, nor resident, may not cut
off her right to the custody of her minor children without obtaining in
personam jurisdiction over her - ostensibly a due process argument.8 The
majority reached its decision by analogizing the mother's right to the
child in a case where she is not present at the custody adjudication to a
wife's right to financial support in an ex parte divorce proceeding. 9 In
the latter situation the Supreme Court has held that the wife's right to
support cannot be cut off, even though the marital bonds may have been
severed.' 0 The majority's analysis in terms of parental right to the chil-
dren is very different from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's, since the former
seems to involve an element of due process." On the other hand, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opposition to the recognition of full faith and
credit is based on notions of child welfare and the scope of the full faith
and credit clause.' 2 Had the majority in May avoided the property right
analogy, the case would be much stronger in terms of full faith and
credit, and therefore more compelling in the present situation.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Batchelor cited any Kentucky
authority in regard to the full faith and credit issue; however, the attitude
of the Kentucky courts is reflected in the recent case of Brengle v. Hurst,
13
which appellant felt resolved the issue in her favor. 14 In that case, the
mother, subsequent to obtaining an Indiana divorce and custody of the
children, moved to Kentucky. The father successfully opened the decree
5. 345 U.S. at 534.
6. 415 S.W.2d at 831.
7. 345 U.S. at 535-36.
8. 345 U.S. at 533.
9. 345 U.S. at 533-34.
10. Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948) ; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
11. See Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees?,
73 YALz L.J. 134, 135 (1963).
12. 345 U.S. at 536.
13. 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966).
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in Indiana and was awarded custody of the children. Notice had been
sent to the mother in Kentucky, but the suit had been commenced in In-
diana without service of process on her or the obtaining of in personam
jurisdiction over her. The father then brought a habeas corpus petition
in Kentucky to enforce the Indiana custody decree, but was refused. The
court, while mentioning changed conditions, welfare of the child, and the
mother's good faith residency, revealed the key aspect of its approach:
The United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule
categorically that child custody matters are within the purview of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, for that Court appreciates the fact that
the welfare of the children is the chief consideration of all of us, and
that a rigid application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause often
would thwart the achievement of that end. 15
This decision and other Kentucky cases favored the court in the instant
case with a number of optional routes to take if it had chosen to detour
a confrontation with the full faith and credit clause in arriving at its
ultimate conclusion, that is, that the lower court had jurisdiction to deter-
mine custody of the children.
Its first option was to regard the Indiana judgment as void.16 The
appellant gave the court sufficient grounds when she claimed that her
ex-husband had lied about his Indiana residency and about knowledge
of appellant's whereabouts at the time of the Indiana action.' A second
option would have been to utilize the changed circumstances doctrine.' 8
15. 408 S.W.2d at 421. In reaching this conclusion the Brengle court failed to
cite specific decisions of the United States Supreme Court. However, for a discussion
of such cases, see pp. 410, 411 & notes 26, 31, 32 infra.
16. Although not exact precedents, the Kentucky court had analogously decided:
to void a foreign custody decree when the child was not domiciled in the foreign state
at the time of the institution of proceedings, except if the child had been removed tofrustrate jurisdiction, Rodney v. Adams, 268 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954) ; to accept anIndiana court's order for a husband's custody of the child where both parents, living
with the children, were before the court, in preference to a subsequent order of the
same court awarding custody to the mother without notice to the father who had
returned to Kentucky, Abbott v. Abbott, 304 Ky. 167, 200 S.W.2d 283 (1947); toinvalidate an Indiana custody decree used in a Kentucky court because the child had
not been present or domiciled in Indiana at the time, on the ground that the state can
act as parens patriae only if the person is within the state, Callahan v. Callahan, 296
Ky. 444, 177 S.W.2d 565 (1944).
17. Brief for Appellant at 16-22, Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1967).
18. The changed circumstances doctrine has evolved through the widespread prac-
tice of limiting the effect of a foreign custody decree by holding that it may be
reexamined in light of changes that have occurred since the original award. This
doctrine is incorporated in the Restatement of Conflicts, which provides that when
such changes are found, a court with jurisdiction may alter the award based upon
such new facts as have arisen. RiESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147, comment a
at 212-13 (1934); RzSTATEMENT OF CONFLICT or LAWS § 117, comment b at 57(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
The doctrine has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. See Ford v.
Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 191 (1962) ; Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958) ; May v.Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 532 (1953) ; New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.610, 613 (1947). See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT or LAWS § 87, at 289-90(1962) ; Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. Rgv.
345, 352 (1953).
Kentucky, when granting full faith and credit to out of state decrees, has
always recognized the changed circumstances limitation. See Chamblee v. Chamblee,248 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1952) ; Frick v. Kaufman, 310 Ky. 829, 222 S.W.2d 185 (1949) ;
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There is no indication of this in the majority opinion,19 and it hardly can
be inferred. A third possible approach would have been to argue that
the father had waived his rights to custody by turning the children over
to the appellant in the first instance (though this is disputed). Lastly, the
court, without voiding the decree, could have employed the equitable
doctrine of "unclean hands"20 by disapproving of the father's alleged
reprehensible conduct before the Indiana court, thereby avoiding the full
faith and credit issue. Instead, it chose to apply May - a case which,
at least in its majority opinion, takes a very parental right oriented view
toward the problem, 21 while the Kentucky cases traditionally have been
child oriented2 2 - and apparently requires that the foreign court have
both parents and the children in front of it, and that no change of cir-
cumstances or inequitable behavior has occurred, before it will grant full
faith and credit to a custody decree.
The dissent is correct, however, in factually distinguishing the instant
case from May, for in the latter the children were not in front of the
Wisconsin court as they were before the Indiana court in Batchelor. Of
course May can be read so that this fact is irrelevant to the majority's
reasoning if one takes its parental right-due process language literally,
but Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion is not in these same
terms, and his concurrence was necessary to overrule the lower court
opinion. At any rate, unless the Kentucky court is changing its orientation
toward the problem of custody decrees, May would seem less appropriate
as support for this decision than would a combination of state precedents
from Kentucky and elsewhere. In any event, the effect of this decision
is to make full faith and credit a dead letter in the child custody area in
Kentucky; however, this conclusion, under the present trend of the law,
is one that has been foreseen.
23
Other state courts have come to substantially the same position even
though their approaches have been different. The strongest stand on state
reservation of complete power to modify custody decrees is exemplified
Abbott v. Abbott, 304 Ky. 167, 200 S.W.2d 283 (1947) ; Callahan v. Callahan, 296 Ky.
444, 177 S.W.2d 565 (1944).
19. 415 S.W.2d at 828-31.
20. In the instant case the court could have found "unclean hands" based on the
same facts that it could have employed to find the Indiana judgment void, see p. 408
supro. For specific application of this doctrine in the custody area see GOODRICH,
CONFLICT oF LAWS §§ 136, 274 (4th ed. 1964) ; Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition
of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. Rev. 345, 357 (1953). (Note that the doctrine has
been renamed in this context, "clean hands."?
The Kentucky court has used the 'clean hands" principle most obviously in
Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 196 S.W.2d 425 (1946) and Stafford v. Stafford, 287
Ky. 804, 155 S.W.2d 220 (1941), cases involving fathers who either violated a decree
of the foreign court or used insidious tactics to get the case to court in Kentucky.
21. See p. 407 supra.
22. The Kentucky court has recognized the paramount interest of the child in its
custody cases. See Brengle v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966) ; Wells v. Wells,
406 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1966) ; McLemore v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1961).
23. See generally R. LEFLAR, CONFLICT oF LAWS § 180, at 349-50 (1959);
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. Rev. 345, 373-74
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by Kansas and New York, the former's position appearing to be that
where the child's welfare is concerned, the state, as parens patriae, regards
itself as totally unbound by foreign custody decrees. 24 New York similarly
states flatly that "[t] he full faith and credit clause does not apply to cus-
tody decrees. '"25
Most other states step more gingerly in this briarpatch, but, by em-
ploying several notable techniques, all reserve considerable leeway in
dealing with foreign custody decrees. One such approach is to carefully
limit the effect of the original decree to only that which it would have
in the issuing state.26 The most frequently employed technique, however,
is the changed circumstances doctrine, 27 since it is the rare case where
such change can not be found. 28 In addition, it is possible to find that the
first court lacked jurisdiction to render a valid custody decree.20 It would
seem that Kentucky simply has utilized this latter technique to its maxi-
mum, were it not for the court's language that even if the decree were
valid it should not be controlling in the present case.30
It would be bold to suggest that the Supreme Court has indicated the
movement to this very position, but it is another thing to say that the
decisions of the Court indicate any other direction for a state court.81
Much current criticism of judicial decisions as unprincipled or un-
articulated tends to overlook the useful part played by decisions in
24. The Kansas approach is reflected in the following cases: Moyer v. Moyer,
171 Kan. 495, 233 P.2d 711 (1951) ; Moloney v. Moloney, 167 Kan. 444, 206 P.2d 1076
(1949) ; Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930) ; In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308,
37 Am. R. 255 (1881).
25. Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 868, 154 N.Y.S.2d
903, 907 (1956). See Hicks v. Bridges, 2 App. Div. 2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (App.
Div. 1956) ; Abreu v. Abreu, 46 Misc. 2d 942, 261 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fam. Ct. 1965).
26. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). In Halvey, when
the mother brought a habeas corpus proceeding in New York to obtain the children
awarded her by a Florida divorce decree, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the modification of the custody award on the narrow ground that the Florida decree
could be modified at all times by the Florida court, and New York, therefore, only
had done what Florida could do. Id. at 614.
Cases illustrating this approach include: Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948) ;
Marlow v. Wene, 240 Cal. App. 2d 670, 49 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) ; State v. Ricketson,
221 La. 691, 60 So. 2d 88 (1952) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 246 Md. 616, 229 A.2d 131 (1967)
In re Craigo, 266 N.C. 92, 145 S.E.2d 376 (1965) ; Cleeland v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16,
105 S.E.2d 114 (1958).
27. See note 18 supra. See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
Marlow v. Wene, 240 Cal. App. 2d 670, 49 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) ; Foster v. Foster,
8 Cal. 2d 719, 68 P.2d 719 (1937) ; Little v. Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949) ;
Faris v. Faris, 35 Ill. 2d 305, 220 N.E.2d 210 (1966) ; Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448,
163 N.E. 269 (1928) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 246 Md. 616, 229 A.2d 131 (1967) ; Sanders
v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (1929) ; In re Reed, 152 Neb. 819, 43
N.W.2d 161 (1950); Cleeland v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958).
28. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bernstein, 80 Cal. App. 2d 921, 183 P.2d 43 (1947)
53 Ky. L.J. 799, 804n.54 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948) ; Dahlke
v. Dahlke, 97 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1957) ; Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218
S.W.2d 566 (1949) ; Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (1929)
In re Reed, 152 Neb. 819, 43 N.W.2d 161 (1950).
30. Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828, 828-29 (Ky. 1967).
31. Supreme Court cases in this area subsequent to May are Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604 (1958) and Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962). In Kovacs the Court
remanded on facts similar to Halvey, see note 26 supra, to the North Carolina courts
[VOL. 13410
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the past which were fraught with creative ambiguity, which moved
in a certain direction but left open the turns that might be taken . 2
The Supreme Court has avoided deciding one of these full faith and
credit cases directly, and there is little to indicate that it will change its
tact in the future. It seems that, similar to certain state courts,3 3 the
Supreme Court, at least tacitly, has recognized that the area of child cus-
tody is unique in the context of the full faith and credit clause, and that
judicial respect for the Court will not wane because it does not demand
strict obeyance to this clause in this area.3 4
The decision in the instant case has moved Kentucky closer to the
position of basing judicial discretion to modify out-of-state custody decrees
entirely upon the ability of the court to adequately provide for the child.
This approach seems necessary if problems of custody are to be adjudi-
cated in our present court system.3 5
John R. Doubman Jr.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - IMPLEADER -
WHERE THE UNITED STATES Is BEING SUED BY AN INDIVIDUAL
CITIZEN IT CAN IMPLEAD A STATE UNDER RULE 14.
Williams v. United States (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
The plaintiff, a New Jersey seaman, brought a suit in admiralty
against the United States in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. He alleged injuries caused by the negli-
gence of the United States, its agents, servants, and employees and by the
for inclusion under the rule stated in Halvey, although Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
dissent accuses the majority of upholding full faith and credit in the custody area by
asking the North Carolina courts to find changed circumstances before modification
of the decree. In Ford, the issue was again avoided when the Court decided that
South Carolina had misinterpreted Virginia law as to the finality of the Virginia
order in front of it, thus neatly shoehorning the case under Halvey.
32. Freund, Rationality in Judicial Decisions, in NoMos VII: RATIONAL DECISION
109, 118 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964). Possible ramifications of the Court's approach are
discussed in Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrecs?,
73 YALE L.J. 134, 138-50 (1963).
33. See Justice Traynor's majority opinion in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32
Cal. 2d 763, 777-80, 197 P.2d 739, 749-50 (1948), in which lie not only indicates the
delicate and unique problems of the area, but suggests the acceptance of multiple
jurisdiction.
34. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 831 (1944).
35. There is considerable authority suggesting that the area will need legislative,
or at least extrajudicial, remedy before satisfactory results will be achieved. See
A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87, at 299-300 (1962) ; Ehrenzweig, Interstate
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unseaworthiness of a vessel furnished by the United States to the State of
New York for use by the New York State Maritime College as a training
ship. The United States claimed a right of indemnity against New York
based upon contractual obligations and warranties and thus sought to
implead New York pursuant to rule 56 of the Supreme Court Admiralty
Rules.'
The district court denied New York's motion to dismiss the third-
party complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person, 2 holding that
neither the wording of rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
nor section 1345 of the Judicial Code, nor the eleventh amendment to
the United States Constitution prevents the United States from impleading
a state when sued by a citizen of another state. Williams v. United States,
42 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Surprisingly, there is only one other case involving this issue, Parks
v. United States,3 where on jurisdictional objections substantially identical
to those before the instant court, opposite conclusions were reached.4 In
Williams, the court specifically dealt with the reasoning in Parks and
refuted all of the arguments presented therein.
New York's first objection to impleader was that rule 14(a) spe-
cifically provides for the service of a third-party complaint "upon a
person ... who is or may be liable" to the defendant 5 and that a state is
not a "person" within the meaning of the rule. 6 The court in Parks had
adopted this view, basing its opinion in part on the particularized definition
of "person" provided in the United States Code. 7 While in ordinary legal
1. Prior to a hearing on New York's objections to the impleader petition, pur-
suant to an order of the United States Supreme Court of February 28, 1965, the
Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases were merged into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court, therefore, considered the petition as if
made pursuant to rule 14(a).
2. New York originally filed exceptions to the impleading petition claiming that
it was immune under the Federal Constitution, and as a sovereign, and that it "cannot
be impleaded as a respondent in this action." 42 F.R.D. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Following the merger of the Admiralty Rules into the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and with the consent of the parties, the court ordered the State's exceptions
to be considered as a motion made pursuant to rule 12(b) (2) of the Federal Rules.
3. 241 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 370 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1966).
4. The holding in Parks has been criticized by those who have commented upon
it. See 65 COLUM. L. Rev. 1506 (1965) ; 64 Micsi. L. Rzv. 948 (1966) ; 13 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 433 (1966).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (emphasis added).
6. The right of the United States, as a defendant, to implead a third-party was
not challenged in either the Williams or the Parks case and has been upheld both
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), and the Admiralty
Rules. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 551-52 (1951) (dictum)
(Federal Tort Claims Act) ; Porto Rico Gas & Coke Co. v. Frank Rullan & Asso-
ciates, Inc., 189 F.2d 397 (1st Cir. 1951) (Federal Tort Claims Act) ; Rich v. United
States, 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949) (Admiralty Rules). See generally 1A W.
BARRON & A. HOLTZHOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 426.3 (Wright ed.
1960) [hereinafter cited as BARRON] ; 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 14.29 (2d ed.
1967) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
7. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides in part:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context in-
dicates otherwise . . . the words "person" and "whoever" include corporations,
[VOL. 13
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usage the term "person" is not considered to include a sovereign,8 courts
can and will go beyond the words of a statute to examine its legislative
environment, "[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the context [and]
the legislative history . . . are aids to construction which may indicate an
intent, by the use of the term [person], to bring state or nation within the
scope of the law."9 The court in Williams accepted this latter approach,
and after examining the purposes of the impleader rule and other applica-
tions of it, concluded that the state should be included within its scope. 10
Clearly the purposes of impleader" are equally served, whether the
third-party is a state or an individual,'12 but despite the desirability of
impleading the state, the question still remains as to whether it is permitted
under rule 14. The liberal construction to be afforded the rules, 3 combined
with the inclusion of the state within the meaning of "person" in other
applications,' 4 seems to support the conclusion reached in Williams that
rule 14 permits the impleading of a state. Analogically, one of the strongest
reasons for permitting the state to be included within the meaning of
''person" is that the Supreme Court has permitted the United States to
be impleaded under rule 14,15 and, while the Court has not always held
that both states and the United States must be considered the same in
regard to the meaning of "person,"' 16 there appears to be no reason in the
present application to distinguish between them.
The court's extensive justification for the inclusion of a state within
the meaning of rule 14(a) seems quite unnecessary, however, when it is
realized that the original claim was initiated under the court's admiralty
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals ...
8. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941).
9. Id. at 605; accord, Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112 (1959).
10. 42 F.R.D. at 613-14.
11. The general purpose of Rule 14 is to avoid two actions which should be
tried together to save the time and cost of a reduplication of evidence, to obtain
consistent results from identical or similar evidence, and to do away with the
serious handicap to a defendant of a time difference between a judgment against
him, and a judgment in his favor against the third-party defendant.
3 MooR f i 14.04 at 501, quoted in Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1959).
12. This was admitted in Parks, 241 F. Supp. at 299-300.
13. See Br'itish Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129, 136-39 (1957).
FtD. R. Civ. P. 1 provides in part: "[The rules] shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
14. Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959) (INT. Rxv. COD4 of 1954,
§ 6332) ; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 210
(1890), now 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964)).
15. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). The Court reasoned
that where the United States had consented to be sued in a separate action, it would
be unduly technical to hold that the same claim could not be brought by means of a
third-party action. Id. at 554. The Court did not appear to be concerned with any
possible limitation imposed by the use of the word "person" in rule 14. While the
Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the United States shall be liable as would a
private person, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), the Court attached no special significance
to the use of the word "person" in rule 14.
16. Compare United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (United States
is not a "person" within the meaning of Sherman Act § 7) with Georgia v. Evans,
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jurisdiction,17 so that the court should have considered the impleader
petition pursuant to rule 14(c).18 The importance of this distinction is
that while rule 14(c)' 9 was intended only to carry forward certain special
admiralty features 20 of admiralty rule 56,21 the phrase "person (individual
or corporation)" in rule 56 was changed to "third-party defendant" in
new rule 14(c)*22 Since the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure makes no mention of this change, 23 it can be argued that the
term "person," as used in rule 14(a) and admiralty rule 56, was never
intended to be any more restrictive than the general term "third-party
defendant," as used in rule 14(c).
A second jurisdictional objection raised in Williams was that the
petition for impleader did not come within the district court's "original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States,"24 since the original action was not commenced by the
United States. The court concluded, without extensive analysis, that the
mere dependency of the United States' claim upon the plaintiff's claim
should not "divest the United States' claim of justiciability," 25 especially
where there was no historical basis for inferring that Congress intended
to exclude third-party proceedings from section 1345.26 On the other
hand, while recognizing that the district courts have jurisdiction over
suits by the United States against a state, regardless of the controversy,
the court in Parks felt that the impleader petition did not constitute an
"action commenced by the United States" within section 1345.27 Neither
court, however, fully examined the wording of section 1345, which pro-
vides original jurisdiction not only in civil actions, but also in "suits or
proceedings commenced by the United States. '2 Cases construing the
17. 42 F.R.D. at 612.
18. FFD. R. Civ. P. 14(c) provides in part:
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of
Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party plaintiff, may bring
in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff
or to the third-party plaintiff. . . . (emphasis added).
19. Rule 14(c) was added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966 as
part of the merger of the Admiralty Rules into the Rules of Civil Procedure.
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 81
(1966), for a description of the special features of admiralty impleader.
21. Admiralty Rule 56 provided in part:
[T]he claimant or respondent (as the case may be) shall be entitled to bring in
any other vessel or person (individual or corporation) who may be partly or
wholly liable either to the libellant or to such claimant or respondent. ...
22. See note 18 supra.
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964).
25. 42 F.R.D. at 614.
26. Id.
27. 241 F. Supp. 297, 298-99 (1965). For support for the position that the district
courts have jurisdiction over all judicial controversies between the United States and
a state see United States v. California, 328 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 817 (1964).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964) (emphasis added).
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meanings of "suit' 2' and "proceeding" 30 have given these terms meanings
broad enough to include impleader.
Another basis for jurisdiction suggested, but not discussed, by the
court in Williams is the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. It is generally
accepted that no independent grounds are needed for jurisdiction over a
third-party claim since the defendant's claim that a third-party is liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim is regarded as ancillary to the
original claim.8 1 Even under the stricter admiralty rule, 2 the only re-
quirement for jurisdiction was that "[T]here must be at least federal (and
possibly also admiralty) jurisdiction over the third-party claim. .... ,,3
Where, as in the Williams or the Parks cases, the court would clearly
have jurisdiction over the United States' claim if brought as a separate
action,8 4 there is no justification for suggesting that this same claim could
not be brought as a third-party proceeding.8 5
The most serious objection to the impleader motion discussed in
Williams is founded upon the sovereign immunity of the states provision
in the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State. .".."36 Based on its view that the
eleventh amendment, "protects the sanctity of state sovereignty against even
being compelled to appear defensively in any suit prosecuted by [an] . . .
individual being heard in any federal court,"37 New York contended that
the "net effect of impleading the State of New York would be to make
the State subject to an admiralty suit by an individual."38 As pointed out
by the court in Williams,89 New York's view is inconsistent with Chief
Justice Marshall's interpretation of the eleventh amendment in Cohens v.
Virginia:
What is a suit? We understand it to be prosecution or pursuit of
some claim, demand or request....
To commence a suit is to demand something by the institution
of process in a court of justice; and to prosecute the suit, is, accord-
29. See note 40 infra.
30. Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329, 368 (1835); Statter v. United
States, 66 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1933).
31. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d
Cir. 1962); United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 975 (1954) ; Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 167 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1948).
See generally 1A BARRON § 424; 3 MooRE 1 14.25-.26; Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction
and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 38-39 (1964).
32. See generally 3 MOOR4 14.20.
33. Id. at 669.
It has been held that an indemnity agreement relating to maritime activities,
as alleged in the Williams case, is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 456 (1947).
34. See note 27 supra.
35. Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951).
36. U.S. CONS'. amend. XI.
37. 42 F.R.D. at 615.
38. Id. at 615-16.
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ing to the common acceptation of language, to continue that demand.
By a suit commenced by an individual against a state, we should
understand process sued out by that individual against the state,
for the purpose of establishing some claim against it by the judg-
ment of a court .... 40
In Ex Parte New York, 41 the Supreme Court ruled that admiralty
jurisdiction is also within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment.
Applying the above criteria to the situation in Williams it can be seen
that the plaintiff is in fact "demanding" nothing from New York. While
the original plaintiff could also assert a claim against the third-party
defendant under rule 14,42 independent jurisdiction would be needed to
support such a claim.43 Realizing that the primary historical purpose of
sovereign immunity, and in particular the eleventh amendment, was to
protect the states from liability, 44 it is easy to discern that impleader does
not violate this purpose since the state is exposed to no liability vis-A-vis
the plaintiff.
The sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment argument be-
comes even less compelling upon an examination of the other instances
where a defendant has been permitted to implead a third-party whom
the original plaintiff could not sue directly. 45 Professor Moore, in dis-
cussing this area, points out that "[n]o legal relationship between the
plaintiff and the third-party defendant need be shown, and it is irrelevant
to the defendant's right to bring in a third party claimed to be liable over
to the defendant, that the plaintiff has no claim against the third
party. .... -4.
40. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407-08 (1821).
41. 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
42. FMn. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part:
The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff....
43. McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960) ; 3 MOORP f 14.27[1].
44. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821). See generally
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
Rev. 1 (1963).
45. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963) (direct em-
ployee-employer suit barred by compensation act but third-party liability based on
admiralty rule of contribution) ; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956) (direct employee-employer suit barred by compensation act
but third-party liability based on separate agreement) ; Drake v. Treadwell Constr.
Co., 299 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1962), vacated & remanded per curiam, 372 U.S. 772(1963) (federal government immune from direct suit by employee but can be im-
pleaded by third-party plaintiff for contribution); Keleket X-Ray Corp. v. United
States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (suit by plaintiff against third-party barred
by statute of limitations, but defendant allowed to implead) ; Henry Fuel Co. v.
Whitebread, 236 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (a covenant by plaintiff not to sue third-
party does not prevent his being impleaded); Hart v. Simons, 223 F. Supp. 109(E.D. Pa. 1963) (direct employee-employer suit barred by compensation act but
employer could still be impleaded). But see Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416
(D.D.C. 1964).
46. 3 MooRx 14.10 at 555.
[VOL. 13
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/10
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The theory of consent was also suggested, but not discussed, by the
court in Williams as a means of overcoming the7eleventh amendment ob-
jections.47 While the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he conclusion
that there has been a waiver of immunity will not be lightly inferred,' 48
the Court has found implied waiver in a situation where a state engaged
in the operation of a railroad after Congress made every railroad liable to
suit.49 Following this reasoning, the alleged agreement by New York
to indemnify the United States could be considered an implied waiver
to whatever immunity to impleader that might have existed. Considering
that the very basis of impleader is the indemnity agreement, express
or implied-in-law, 50 New York should have been fully aware that, on the
basis of that agreement, it would be impleaded into suits initiated by
individuals against the United States. 51
If the United States were not permitted to implead New York because
of the eleventh amendment, a secondary question concerning the applica-
bility of the "vouching-in" doctrine would arise. Under this concept, an
indemnitor who is given reasonable notice of a claim against his in-
demnitee, and is given an opportunity to participate in the defense, will
be considered bound by a valid judgment, as to the existence and extent
of the indemnitee's liability, regardless of whether he actually participated
in the suit.52 While the "vouching-in" doctrine would not directly compel
New York to enter the suit as impleader would, it would effectively force
New York to intervene to protect its interests. This approach would also
raise the issue of immunity under the eleventh amendment. 53
Both of the jurisdictional objections to impleader could be answered
by substituting more succinct language, since no substantive rights are
involved in these objections. Rule 14(a) could be amended to conform
with the language in rule 14(c) ,54 and the Judicial Code could be amended
to specifically grant the district courts jurisdiction over impleader actions
by the United States against a state.55 Finally, by rejecting Parks' ap-
proach to the eleventh amendment objection to impleader, an approach that
would protect the state from impleader but not from direct suit by the
United States, the Williams court has eliminated the possibility of multiple
litigation and inconsistent results - the very type of circuity and ineffective-
ness the rules were designed to prevent.
Mark S. Dichter
47. 42 F.R.D. at 616.
48. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959)
accord, Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
49. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
50. 3 MOORE 14.03[1] at 432.
51. See 65 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1506, 1509 (1965).
52. R.STATEMENT OP JUDGMENTS §§ 107, 108 (1942); see Washington Gaslight
Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); 1B MOORE f" 0.405[9]; 3 MooRn
14.02.
53. See 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1506, 1509 (1965) ; 64 MIcH. L. REv. 948, 952 n.26
(1966) ; 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 433, 445 (1966).
54. See note 18 supra.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE - Loss OF CONSORTIUM - BOTH SPOUSES
MUST JOIN IN THE ACTION AND THE ACTION MUST BE JOINED
WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S ACTION FOR PHYSICAL INJURY.
Deems v. Western Md. Ry. (Md. 1967)
Plaintiff brought an action against defendants for the loss of the
consortium of her husband. Prior to this suit, plaintiff's husband had
settled his claim for personal injuries with the same defendants. De-
fendants demurred to this action on the ground that under Maryland
law a wife has no cause of action for loss of consortium caused by the
negligence of a third party. The Superior Court of Baltimore sustained
the demurrers and on appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals, avoiding
plaintiff's claim that denial of the wife's action would violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,' affirmed, holding that
neither husband nor wife may sue for loss of consortium in a negligence
action as individuals. Instead, they must sue in a joint action for injury
to the marital entity and such suit must be joined with the individual
action for physical injury.2 Deems v. Western Md. Ry., Md -........--
231 A.2d 514 (1967).
The common law recognized an action for loss of consortium by a
husband against a negligent tortfeasor who had injured the husband's
wife thereby depriving him of his wife's services, society, and sexual
relations.3 Loss of services was a requirement for the cause of action
at the common law, with the right to damages for the other aspects
being dependent upon showing such loss.4 Recognizing the loss of services
as the required element of the cause of action, the common law refused
to allow wives to sue for loss of consortium where their husbands had
been negligently injured. This rule was based on the common law theory
that women were not entitled to the services of their husbands.5 Gradually,
the requirement of loss of services to the husband was ignored by the
courts,6 and soon after the Married Women's Acts7 were passed, a wife
1. Recent cases finding such discrimination to be unconstitutional include: Owen
v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio
Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. Paulding County 1965). Contra, Krohn v. Richard-
son Merrell, Inc., __ Tenn. App _. , 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
970 (1967).
2. Since plaintiff's husband had already settled his claim, she was barred from
recovery.
3. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 635 (1956) ; W. PROSSER, THE
LAW op TORTS 903 (3d ed. 1964). Four states allowed neither party to maintain this
cause of action. Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911) ; Bolger
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Helmstetler v. Duke
Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945) ; Martin v. United Elec. Ry., 71 R.I.
137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
4. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, at 638.
5. Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861) ; W. PROSSER, supra note 3,
at 903, 916; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 695 (1938) ; 31 TEMP. L.Q. 284 (1958).
6. See Tomme v. Pullman Co., 207 Ala. 511, 93 So. 462 (1922); Aderhold v.
Stewart, 172 Okla. 77, 46 P.2d 346 (1935).
"[T~he chief importance of loss of services today appears to be that the
plaintiff must show that he is the person who would be entitled to such services."
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was permitted to recover, even without a showing of loss of services, where
there was an intentional injury to her husband. 8 Finally, in 1950, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit permitted recovery
in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,9 rejecting the common law reasoning as a
basis for denying women the right to damages for loss of consortium
where a husband had been injured by a negligent tortfeasor.
After Hitaffer, the large majority of scholars and writers favored
recovery,10 but most of the courts rejected the new view." However,
"[a]round 1958 something of a current of support for the Hitaffer case
set in, and since that date the trend has been definitely in the direction
of approval.' 2 To date, fifteen states' 3 and the District of Columbia14
allow the wife's recovery. Of these sixteen jurisdictions, three require
joinder with the husband's action for physical injury. 15
The court in the instant case was faced with the question of the
constitutionality of depriving a wife recovery for a tort, which, if it were
committed against her husband, would have been the basis of damages.
At first blush, it appears that the main reason for the ultimate decision
in the case at bar was to avoid a conflict with the Constitution;16 how-
W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 913. Contra, Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854);Whitaker v. Warren, 60 N.H. 20 (1880).
7. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1963); Mo. R4v. STAT.
§ 451.290 (1959).
8. See, e.g., Bird v. Ellingsworth, 156 Or. 103, 65 P.2d 674 (1937); Kauchner
v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959) ; Morey v. Keller, 77 S.D. 49, 85 N.W.2d
57 (1957) ; see W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 903-04.
9. -183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
10. See F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 3, at 640-43; W. PROSSER, supra note 3,
at 917; 48 CALIF. L. REV. 882 (1960) ; 50 KENT. L.J. 263 (1961) ; 26 MD. L. REv. 361(1966) ; 10 S.D.L. REv. 120 (1965) ; 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 276 (1965) ; 5 WASHBURN
L.J. 112 (1965) ; 18 W. Ris. L. Rv. 621 (1967). But see Jaffe, Damages for Personal
Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 219 (1953) ; Thurman,
Recovery by Wife for Loss of Consortium of the Husband, 24 INS. COUNSEL J.
224 (1957).
11. See, e.g., Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449(1958) ; Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960) ; W. PROSSER, supra
note 3, at 918.
12. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 918.
13. Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961) ; Cooney
v. Mooman, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller,
277 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717(1961); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (Ct.
App. 1953) ; Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) ; Acuff v. Schmit,
248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Deems v. Western Md. Ry., ..... Md. 231
A.2d 514 (1967); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960);
Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1964); Ekalo v.
Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965) ; Clem v. Brown,
3 Ohio Misc. 67, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. Paulding County 1965); Ross v. Cuthbert,
239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1946); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d
669 (1959); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d
137 (1967).
14. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
852 (1950).
15. Deems v. Western Md. Ry., Md. , 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Ekalo v.
Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Moran v. QualityAluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
16. Oppenheimer, J., writing for the court, acknowledges that it was one of the
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ever, if this were so, the court could have chosen to change its common
law in one of three ways: allow either spouse to bring the action without
a joinder requirement,"7 allow either spouse to bring the action, with
the stipulation that it be joined procedurally with the personal injury
action, or do away with the cause of action altogether. Instead, the ap-
proach taken was to examine what the cause of action for loss of con-
sortium sought to remedy, and on this basis decide who, if anyone, should
be allowed to recover.' 8
Cognizance was first taken of the real meaning of loss of consortium,
the court establishing that it was "the loss of society, affection, assistance
and conjugal fellowship."' 9 In taking this first step, the Deems court
merely reiterated what other courts which had allowed the wife to recover
had concluded. However, while earlier courts stopped at stating that
women were also entitled to damages because they too were injured by
loss of consortium and had a right to protection, the Maryland court
sought a more substantial and fundamental legal theory as the basis for
its decision. To find this theory, it went to the postulate behind the cause
of action, that is, it examined the cause of action without considering
whether one or both spouses should be entitled to damages. 20 It was
concluded that the tort was built on a foundation of "a right to recover
for an injury to the marital entity."' 21 With this established, the court
proceeded to treat the action as one of first impression.22
Focus was then turned to the injured party, the marital entity, and it
was noted that this entity is recognized by the law in other contexts. 23
From this point of departure, the court merely extended the concept
of man and wife as one entity "to permit recovery for wrongs negli-
gently caused to the legal unity through the physical injury of either
spouse," 24 and required the action to be brought by both parties, in a
joint action.
This theory defeats all the reasons put forth in denying women the
right to damages for loss of consortium. It recognizes that loss of services
is a fiction and disregards it as a requirement for either the husband or
the wife. It solves the problem of a possible double recovery by recog-
nizing that just a single wrong has been committed, that is, an injury to
the marital relationship, and thus only one recovery is justified. Therefore,
the physically injured spouse would be barred from claiming damages
compensated for under the joint claim. A further safeguard against
17. The fifteen jurisdictions which recognized the wife's cause of action allowed
each spouse to recover as individuals.
18. Md. at ----- ,231 A.2d at 520-21.
19. Id. at ----- ,231 A.2d at 517.
20. Id. at 231 A.2d at 521.
21. Id.
22. Id. at ----- ,231 A.2d at 524.
23. Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A.2d 28 (1955) (husband
and wife may be tenants by the entireties).
24 -......Md  at ___ 231 A.2d at 521 (emphasis added).
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double recovery is the requirement that both actions be brought at the
same time.
The analysis employed by the Deems court also responds to the claim
of women that men and women have received unequal treatment before
the courts. Neither spouse has any advantage, but rather each spouse's
ability to sue is dependent upon joinder with the other. "They are treated
in legal contemplation as the partners they are in fact."'25
While this approach is unique and logically sound, the results, at
best, will only equal those found in jurisdictions allowing both spouses
to recover in individual actions. All the jurisdictions which allow the wife
to recover recognize that loss of services is not required. Double recovery
is avoided in those jurisdictions by instructions to the jury26 limiting
the uninjured spouse's recovery to his independent loss of consortium.
Finally the equal protection afforded by this decision is in practice no
greater protection than that found in the other jurisdictions. 27
While this court's approach is theoretically sound in that it recognizes
the tort for what it should be in theory,28 when the practical ramifications
of the decision are evaluated it does not take the rights of the parties
any further than Hitaffer. To the contrary, it could lead to a loss of
rights. For example, suppose the injury to the spouse caused him to
become extremely irritable, thereby destroying the marriage, and the
injured spouse refused to join in a claim with the other spouse. Here,
clearly the entity which the court seeks to protect has been injured, but
under the court's ruling, no relief will be in the offing. The court could not
compel the injured spouse to bring an action which he or she did not wish
to bring.29 The court itself hinted at another shortcoming of this ap-
proach.30 Suppose a spouse's employer was the negligent tortfeasor, and
25. Id.
26. E.g., Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d
137 (1967).
27. Other courts have assured the wife equal protection by maintaining the hus-
band's ability to bring suit and simply elevating the wife to the same plane, thereby
granting both the same capacity to sue. The Deems court achieves equal protection
by elevating the wife's right to sue while compromising the husband's traditional
ability to bring suit, for both parties are required to join in the suit before it will be
allowed. Under either approach, the spouses stand on the same plane inter se, albeit
different planes.
28. The court cites the following writings as favoring this theory: Foster,
Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 ILL. L. FORUM 493; Fridman, Consortium
as an 'Interest' in the Law of Torts, 32 CANADIAN BAR REv. 1065 (1954) ; Green,
Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rlv. 460 (1934) ; 61 COLUm. L. Rtv. 1341 (1961);
29 N.C.L. Riv. 178 (1951); 25 TUL. L. Rzv. 293 (1951); 5 WASHBURN L.J. 112
(1965). However, a close analysis of these materials would indicate that none of
these commentors would favor this court's approach over an approach that would allow
each spouse to recover for loss of consortium where his or her partner has been negli-
gently injured. It would seem that the court has read more into the articles than was
contained therein.
29. Judge Friendly, in Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 264
(2d Cir. 1963), expresses doubt that even a procedural joinder can be compelled.
30. We do not decide the effect which any federal statute, such as the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, may have in foreclosing any claim for consortium under
the Maryland law in cases where such a statute is applicable.
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was statutorily immune from suit by an employee. If the jurisdiction
adopted Deems' approach, the marriage entity would be left without a
remedy due to the lack of standing of one spouse. Granting the soundness
of recognizing the marriage as a legal entity, it is the individuals in the
marriage, and not the legal concept, who are injured, and it is the indi-
viduals who should be given the protection of the law.
George John Cappiello, Jr.
LABOR LAW - REMEDIES - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER REQUIRING EMPLOYER TO READ UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES REJECTED AS INAPPROPRIATE TO ACCOMPLISH
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS.
IUE v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1967)
The International Union of Electrical Workers brought charges
against Scott's, Inc., alleging that during the union's attempt to organize
company employees, corporate officials engaged in extensive violations of
sections 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.'
These violations included the interrogation of employees concerning their
interest in the union, threats of loss of jobs and existing benefits, coercion
of employees to resist the union, promises of benefits if the union were
rejected, anti-union speeches, and the discriminatory discharge of union
sympathizers.
The National Labor Relations Board, after reviewing the trial ex-
aminer's findings, issued a cease and desist order, and ordered the rein-
statement with back pay of the discharged employees. Other remedies
included ordering the employer to: mail to each employee notice of his
statutory right to be free from coercion, interference, and restraint; post
copies of this same notice; allow the union one hour of company time to
present its position; and read the notice at a meeting of the employees
to be held during working hours.2
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit,3 the court affirmed the Board's order, except for the
provision compelling the employer to read the cease and desist order
1. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title; (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment....
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(3) (1964).
2. Scott's, Inc., 62 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1966).
3. The National Labor Relations Act, section 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964),
states that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denyingin whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United
States court of appeals. .. "
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to the employees, holding that such a provision is inappropriate to
achieve the sought after goal of dissemination of information concerning
employees' rights, and is, moreover, humiliating and degrading to the
employer. JUE v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2081 (D.C. Cir. September 6,
1967).
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act allows the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board wide discretion in ordering a party found
guilty of committing unfair labor practices to take such affirmative
action as will effectuate the policies of the Act.4 The courts have recog-
nized that "the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for
administrative competence,"' and is to be ascertained by the Board in
the exercise of its presumed expertise6 in the labor area. The Board can
thus adapt its remedies to fit the needs of the particular situation7 in its
attempt to restore the conditions and relationships that would have existed
had there been no unfair labor practice.8
In formulating remedies, the Board has attempted on occasion to go
beyond the usual combination of cease and desist orders and reinstate-
ment with or without back pay in cases where it feels it is dealing with
"massive and flagrant" unfair labor practices. 9 When reviewed by the
4. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact
and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay,
as well effectuate the policies of this subchapter ...
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
5. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) ; accord, Fibreboard
Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) ; NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling
Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953) ; J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 303(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1967) (No. 684).
6. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964);
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 349 (1953).
7. Local 60, Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) ; NLRB v. District
50, United Mine Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958) ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,
348 (1938).
8. Local 60, Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 657 (1961) ; Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938) ; J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380
F.2d 292, 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' v.
NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
9. 1 LAB. REL. Rtp., 66 Analysis 7 (September 11, 1967). One such attempt has
taken the form of requiring the employer to post the unfair labor practice notice in
the plant. See, e.g., IUE v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2081 (D.C. Cir. September 6, 1967) ;
J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. H. W. Elson
Bottling Co., 379 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1967). Another Board remedy has been to make
the plant facilities available to the union for speech making purposes. This was accepted
by the court in IUE v. NLRB, supra, but was rejected in NLRB v. H. W. Elson
Bottling Co., supra. Another Board remedy has been to require the employer to mail
copies of the unfair labor practice notice to all the employees. See, e.g., IUE v.
NLRB, supra; J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, supra; NLRB v. H. W. Elson Bottling
Co., supra. Still another remedy has been to grant the union access to plant bulletin
boards for a specified period. This remedy was approved in NLRB v. H. W. Elson
Bottling Co., supra, but was rejected in J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, supra. Another
remedy has been to require the employer to read the unfair labor practice notice to all
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courts of appeal, these attempts have met with varied success.10 Though
this inconsistency in result is attributable in some respects to the different
factual situations involved, it is more often the result of different courts
applying different standards of review, and, at times, the same court
applying different standards from case to case.
The National Labor Relations Act, section 10(e), provides that the
reviewing court has the power "to make and enter a decree enforcing,
modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in
part the order of the Board,""u but it is silent as to the criteria to be
employed in exercising this power of review. In light of the discretion
allowed the Board in fashioning remedies under section 10(c), 12 it might
be presumed that the reviewing court is to determine merely whether the
Board's order does, in fact, effectuate the policies of the Act. However,
the courts have not limited themselves to this standard in reviewing
Board orders.
One standard demands that the court enforce the Board order "un-
less it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends
other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the
Act,"' 3 while other standards allow the court to reject the remedy as
punitive,14 oppressive, or inappropriate. 16 However, despite this multi-
plicity of standards,
[t]he principles which guide appellate courts in reviewing ques-
tions of law and fact are plainly of a very general nature leaving much
Cir. 1959). However, in IUE v. NLRB, supra, and NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966), such a remedy was rejected. In J. P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, supra, the Board remedy was modified to allow the employer
the option of having a Board representative read the notice.
10. Cases cited note 9 supra; Note, The Need For Creative Orders Under Section
10(c) of The National Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. Rev. 69, 90-91 (1963).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
12. See note 4 supra.
13. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943) ; accord,
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) ; Local 57, Int'l
Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 942 (1967).
14. [T]his authority to order affirmative action does not go so far as to confer
a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty
it may choose because he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the
Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such
an order.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938). Accord, Local 60,
Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) ; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940) ; Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 374
F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967); NLRB v. Local 85,
Sheet Metal Workers', 274 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1960).
15. The Board cannot apply "a remedy it has worked out on the basis of its
experience, without regard to circumstances which may make its application to a
particular situation oppressive and therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy of
the Act." NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953). Accord,
NLRB v. District 50, United Mine Workers', 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958).
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. District 50, United Mine Workers', 355 U.S. 453, 458(1958); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953) ; IUE v. NLRB,
66 L.R.R.M. 2081 (D.C. Cir. September 6, 1967) ; J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380
F.2d 292, 304 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 374
F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
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to the discretion of the judges involved. . . . [The principles] should
be taken as providing only the most general indication of the nature
of review to be accorded by any given court in a particular case. 17
In his dissent in JUE, Judge Wright expressed the feeling that the
Board order in question was not a "patent attempt" to achieve inappropri-
ate ends, and thus, should be enforced.18 The "patent attempt" test allows
for little judicial review of a Board order, and to overturn an order solely
on this basis almost requires the reviewing court to question the integrity
of the Board's intentions. 19 Therefore, not surprisingly, the application
of this test seems to be limited to cases where a reviewing court has upheld
a Board order,20 or where a dissenting judge has argued against the rejec-
tion of a Board order,21 or at the most, where the reviewing court rejecting
the Board order has used it in conjunction with other, more practical
tests. 22
While the Board order under consideration in IUE quite probably
was not a "patent attempt," the majority did not feel restricted solely
to that standard for in invalidating the order it cited an earlier District
of Columbia Court of Appeals case23 which recognized the "patent at-
tempt" test, but which also characterized the Board order then under
review as inappropriate, punitive in nature, and as "not effectuat[ing]
a policy of the Act. ' 24 The application of these latter tests is crucial, for if
the majority in IUE had restricted itself to the use of the "patent attempt"
test, its rejection of the Board order would not have been justified.
On such an important point, the court's lack of treatment is regrettable.
If the purpose of requiring the employer to read the notice is to dis-
seminate information to the employees concerning their rights, the order
appears to be clearly inappropriate, as the majority claims.25 The employer
is already required, by virtue of the other remedies of the Board which
the court has approved, to post the unfair labor practice notice and to
17. A. Cox & D. C. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 168 (6th ed.
1965). See generally Note, The Need For Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of
The National Labor Relations Act, supra note 10, at 92-94; 19 VAND. L. REv. 512,
513-14 (1966).
18. 66 L.R.R.M. at 2083.
19. Cf., Note, The Need For Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of The
National Labor Relations Act, supra note 10, at 92.
20. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB
v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953) ; Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943) ; NLRB v. Broderick Wood Prod.. Co., 261 F.2d 548
(10th Cir. 1958).
21. See, e.g., Local 60, Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961) (dissenting
opinion) ; IUE v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2081, 2083 (D.C. Cir. September 6, 1967)
(dissenting opinion).
22. See, e.g., Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967) ; Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 275
F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1960).
23. Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denieed, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
24. Id. at 300.
25. "We reject this [remedy] as being inappropriate to achieve the sought-after
goal of dissemination of information concerning employees' rights." IUE v. NLRB,
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mail copies of it to all the employees, and to allow the union access to
the employees, during working hours, in order to present its position.
It is doubtful that the reading by the employer will disseminate any in-
formation that the employees have not already obtained through these
other remedies. The order becomes all the more inappropriate when com-
bined with the fact that it would be "humiliating and degrading to the
employer and undoubtedly would have a lingering effect on future
relations between the company and the Union, '26 by helping to solidify
the anti-union sentiment of the company. Such a result would conflict
with the avowed purpose of the NLRA to foster amicable relations
between the two parties.27
The same remedy was approved by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Jackson Tile Mfg. Co. v. NLRB.28 However, the Board
order2 9 in that case indicated that the employer encouraged employees not
to read a notice posted in accordance with an earlier settlement, and
further, that some of the employees were illiterate, problems of dissemina-
tion which were not present in IUE. Furthermore, the Jackson court did
not have under review a Board order allowing the union access to the
employees to explain its position, as did IUE. The viability of Jackson,
however, appears to be in doubt by virtue of a later Fifth Circuit case"0
in which the court refused, despite the finding that some of the employees
were illiterate, to enforce such an order because it was "unnecessarily
embarrassing and humiliating to management, rather than effectuating
the policies of the Act."8 1
The recent case of I. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB3 2 suggests that
there may be a purpose other than the dissemination of information to
employees behind an order requiring a reading by the employer. "[The
order was designed] 'to undo the effect' of numerous and egregious unfair
labor practices by insuring that the full counteracting force of the
remedial order would be felt by the employees. 8 83 The restoration of the
26. Id. at 2083.
27. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
28. 272 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1959).
29. Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 764 (1958).
30. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1966).
31. Id. at 869. The Laney court does not mention the Jackson case, let alone
expressly overrule it. Of course, the court could not overrule it without disregarding
the fact that the reviewing court is to judge each remedy as it is applied to the
particular situation and is not to categorically reject any remedy as never appropriate.
However, it is interesting to note that the facts involved in both cases were similar.
Both were concerned with flagrant violations of section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA
through interrogation of employees concerning their union activity, surveillance of
union activities, and general coercion. Also, both involved the discriminatory dis-
charge of employees. But, perhaps the major distinction is that, since the union had
succeeded in its effort to become the employees' bargaining agent, the Laney court
was free to merely uphold the Board order requiring the employer to bargain with
the union. In Jackson, the union had not obtained a majority, and perhaps it was felt
that the forced reading was necessary to give the union a fair chance of obtaining one.
32. 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967).
33. Id. at 305. See IUE v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2081, 2083 (D.C. Cir. September
6, 1967) (dissenting opinion).
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status quo is recognized as a primary purpose of the Board's remedy34
and there can be little doubt that requiring the employer to read the notice
to all employees will help to restore it. An assembly of all employees
during working hours to inform them as to their rights would seem to
carry more authority than word of mouth communication, or even the
posting and mailing of notices.35 However, in the instant case the court
has already approved of granting the union access to all the employees
for one hour during company time to make a speech, in itself a novel
and somewhat drastic order.80 This action will have essentially the same
effect in restoring prior conditions, thus questioning the necessity of
imposing upon the employer the embarrassing duty of personally informing
the employees of their rights. Furthermore, it would seem that remedies
ostensibly designed to undo the effect of unfair labor practices, by their
very nature, run the risk of being punitive. A forced reading to the
employees is an example, especially here, where the other approved reme-
dies make such a reading unnecessary. As stated in an earlier District of
Columbia Court of Appeals decision, "the purpose of Board remedies
is to rectify the harm done the injured workers, not to provide punitive
measures against errant employers. '[T]he power to command affirmative
action is remedial, not punitive.' "3 This holds true, "even though the
Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated
by such an order."38
It is suggested that the court reached the right conclusion in reject-
ing the order requiring the employer to read the notice to employees,
despite the superficial analysis proffered in its support. In this particular
situation, the policies of dissemination of information and return of the
status quo do not, as a result of other effective available remedies, call
for the imposition of remedies which may be humiliating, embarrassing,
or possibly punitive. The court stated that this remedy was not inap-
propriate in all cases, 9 but since no guidelines for its application are
offered, it must be presumed that such an order approaches acceptability
only where the dissemination of information presents a unique problem, 40
or where the restoration of the status quo is not already adequately pro-
vided for by other remedies, such as union access to the employees for a
one hour speech.
In Stevens, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals modified a similar
Board order by giving the employer the choice of reading the notice him-
34. See cases cited note 8 supra.
35. Cf. H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714, 716n.7 (1965).36. "[Rlequiring the company to pay employees to listen to a union speech on
company property is fairly 'strong medicine.'" NLRB v. H. W. Elson Bottling Co.,
379 F.2d 223, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1967).
37. Local 57, Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).38. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938). See cases
cited note 14 supra.
39. 66 L.R.R.M. at 2083.
40. Thus, the order would be more appealing where, for example, the employees
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self, or having it read by a Board representative, maintaining that this
would guarantee effective communication and help restore prior condi-
tions, without subjecting the employer to humiliation. The JUE court
considered this approach and rejected it as "creat[ing] a problem more
severe than the one it supposedly solves."'41 The first basis for the rejec-
tion of the Stevens approach was that it was a de novo remedy being
prescribed by the court, and that this ran "counter to the premise that
remedies should be worked out by those having the most experience and
expertise in the area."'42 In contradiction, the Stevens court was of the
opinion that it was merely modifying a Board order, a procedure per-
mitted by section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.43 It would
appear that the essence of the Board remedy in Stevens was the gathering
of all the employees so that they might be orally informed of their rights.
In view of this, the question narrows merely to that of deciding who shall
convey the information. To grant the employer the option of having a
Board representative read the order is merely another method of imple-
menting the remedy, hardly more than a modification, as opposed to a new
remedy.
The more important ground for the rejection of the Stevens
solution is that the reading of the notice by the Board representative
would cast the Board in a position of less than complete neutrality, placing
its imprimatur on the particular union's activities and on union activities
in general. While it must be conceded that allowing a Board representa-
tive to read the notice creates a possibility that some employees will
think the Board is not neutral, this same possibility exists when employees
see a copy of the Board order on the plant bulletin board, receive copies of
it in the mail, or see that the Board has ordered the employer to allow
the union to speak with them during working hours. Surely all the
employees are aware of the litigation involved, and that the Board has
ordered these resultant remedies. The only distinction is that the Stevens
solution brings a Board representative physically on the scene, and it is
difficult to see how this, without more, will create the problems that the
majority foresees.
While it is felt that the court was incorrect in refusing to modify in
accordance with Stevens on the above two bases, it is suggested that
its final solution was correct, because the modification was unnecessary
in light of the other approved remedies. Nevertheless, in cases where the
communication of information and the restoration of prior conditions
have not already been adequately provided for by other remedies, such
a modification would be appropriate, since it has all the advantages of
the forced reading without the attendant humiliation. Therefore, contrary
41. 66 L.R.R.M. at 2082n.5.
42. Id.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
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to the conclusion of the IUE court, 4 4 it is difficult to foresee any situation
where the forced reading would be appropriate.
There has been increasing pressure for stronger remedies to deter
flagrant unfair labor practices, 45 and the orders under review in the
instant case are illustrative of the National Labor Relation Board's recent
attempts to cope with such situations. But often, as here, the reviewing
courts have felt that such orders go beyond the Board's 10(c) power,
thereby lending support to the argument that the more realistic solution
lies in congressional legislation.46
David H. Huggler
LABOR LAW - UNIONS - UNION MEMBER MUST EXHAUST INTRA-
UNION APPELLATE PROCEDURES BEFORE FILING UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE CHARGE.
Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB (3d Cir. 1967)
Holder, a member of petitioner, filed intra-union charges with his local
in which he alleged a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley
Act1 in that the local president had wrongfully caused his employer to
44. 66 L.R.R.M. at 2083; see p. 427 supra.
45. See 19 VAND. L. Rxv. 512, 514-15 (1966) citing Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 124-39 (1964), which suggests as illustrative of the stronger
remedies proposed: criminal sanctions for wilful violations, punitive damages, greater
use of the preliminary injunction, and the ordering of the employer to bargain with the
union where it does not represent a majority of the employees. See Note, The Need
For Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of The National Labor Relations Act,
supra note 10, at 81-90.
46. For recent developments in this area, see 1 LAB. tL. RnP., 65 Analysis 53-56
(July 31, 1967).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964), which reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisi-
tion or retention of membership therein ...
Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
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discriminate against him. These charges were dismissed by the local, and
Holder, disregarding the International Constitution's requirement that a
member exhaust intra-union appellate procedures before bringing an admin-
istrative or judicial action, filed an 8(b) (1) (A) unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging the same conduct
which had comprised his unsuccessful complaint before the local. The
charge was dismissed by the General Counsel. Subsequently, petitioner
found Holder to have violated the International Constitution, and dismissed
him from membership. After an unsuccessful appeal for reinstatement,
heard by the General Executive Board of the International, Holder again
filed an 8(b) (1) (A) charge with the NLRB alleging that petitioner's
action in dismissing him from membership was an unfair labor practice.
The Board, applying the rule enunciated in the Charles S. Skura2 case,
found an unfair labor practice and issued a remedial order. 3 On appeal,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proviso to
section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, substantiated by the proviso
to section 101 (a) (4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act,4 permits unions to estab-
lish and enforce rules requiring its members to exhaust reasonable intra-
union appellate procedures. Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB,
379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3205
(U.S. Nov. 6, 1967) (No. 796).
Before the court considered the effect of the 8(b) (1) (A) and
101 (a) (4) provisos on the disciplinary action taken by the union in the
instant case, it focused on section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act5 to ascertain
whether a union member's right to institute proceedings with the NLRB
was guaranteed by that section.6 The court noted that nowhere in the
text of section 7 is there mentioned anything about a right to file charges
with the Board7 and indicated that the rationale of the Board in Skura,
whereby the Board engrafted upon section 7 "a general right of unlimited
2. 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
3. Edwin D. Holder, 62 L.R.R.M. 1301 (June 23, 1966).
The Board's order to the union read:
Cease and desist from expelling members for filing charges with NLRB; in
any like or related manner, interfering with employees' LMRA rights. Upon
request, reinstate employee to membership without requiring payment of back
dues for period of expulsion except for portion of dues found to [be] [sic]
allocable to cost of union's welfare benefits and with reimbursement with 6 percent
interest for any loss suffered as result of absence of such benefits; post notices.
62 L.R.R.M. at 1302.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964) reads in part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute
an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency .. .
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hear-
ing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such
organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such
organizations. ...
5. For the text of section 7 see note 1 supra.
6. Restraint or coercion employed by a union against a member for exercising
a right guaranteed by section 7 is a section 8(b) (1) (A) unfair labor practice. Sec
note 1 supra.
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access to the Board," was unacceptable." The correct view, it asserted,
is that by necessary implication the right to file particular charges before
the Board is protected by section 7 only when "the charges themselves . . .
assert misconduct which, if proved, would constitute a deprivation of rights
declared in that section."9 The court then indicated that the case would
have been remanded to the NLRB for a determination of the subject
matter of Holder's initial complaint if the 8(b) (1) (A) and 101(a) (4)
provisos had not otherwise mandated reversal of the Board's order.'0
When the issue of a union's right to discipline a member for filing a
charge with the NLRB before first exhausting prescribed intra-union
appellate procedures came before the Board in Charles S. Skura, it held
that under section 8(b) (1) (A) an unfair labor practice was committed
by the union for imposing the discipline." The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals subsequently adopted the Skura rule in Roberts v.
NLRB.12 In both Skura and Roberts, a member was fined by his union
for instituting administrative proceedings before first exhausting the pre-
scribed intra-union appellate procedures. In Skura, the NLRB found that
a fine was by nature coercive and that its imposition restrained and coerced
the member in the exercise of his right to file charges with the Board. 1"
Furthermore, it made no difference that the fine was allegedly levied upon
the member to enforce a union rule requiring exhaustion of intra-union
appellate procedures since such a rule was not protected by the proviso of
section 8(b) (1) (A).14 The Board reasoned:
Considering the overriding public interest involved . . . no private
organization should be permitted to prevent or regulate access to the
Board, and a rule requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies by
means of which a union seeks to prevent or limit access to the Board's
processes is beyond the lawful competency of a labor organization to
enforce by coercive means. 5
The Board in the Skura case also held that section 101 (a) (4) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act prohibited the union's disciplinary action notwith-
standing the proviso of that section which states that a union member may
be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
8. Id. at 706-07.
9. Id. at 706.
10. Id. at 707.
11. 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) ; accord, Van Camp Sea Food, 62 L.R.R.M. 1298(June 21, 1966).
12. 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
13. 148 N.L.R.B. at 682.
14. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the NLRB distinguished it's earlier Russell
Scofield (Wisconsin Motor case) decision, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), where it was
decided that the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) protected a union's disciplinary action
against a member who violated an internal union rule establishing earning ceilings,
since such a rule was a matter of internal union affairs, over which Congress intended
no regulation.
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four month lapse of time) within his union before invoking the aid of the
courts or an administrative agency.' The Board relied on an interpretation
of this proviso by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Detroy v.
American Guild of Variety Artists17 where it was held that this proviso
applied to the ability of a court or an administrative agency to require a
union member to exhaust reasonable intra-union hearing procedures that
have been established by the member's union.' 8 The Board therefore con-
cluded that a union could not impose sanctions on a member for failure
to exhaust reasonable intra-union hearing procedures under authority of
the 101 (a) (4) proviso because that proviso was not addressed to unions,
but rather to courts or administrative agencies.' 9
The Third Circuit in Marine Workers, contrary to the Board, did not
feel that a union rule requiring a member to exhaust intra-union remedies
before making application for relief to the NLRB or the judiciary was
violative of public policy. 20 The court concluded that only those rules,
promulgated by a union pursuant to the 8(b) (1) (A) proviso, 21 which
had the effect of frustrating the operation of the Act would be proscribed. 22
A rule requiring a union member to postpone his right to file charges with
the Board "until after a practical and reasonable resort to internal remedies"
does not impede "the normal and proper administration of the Act."123
Thus, the court distinguished between a union rule which completely
prevents a member's access to administrative or judicial proceedings and
a rule which merely postpones this access. The court did indicate, however,
that a union member would have immediate access to the courts or an
administrative agency to obtain a determination of whether an intra-union
remedy is in fact available, and if so, whether resort to it would impose
unreasonable delay or hardship upon the member. 24 The court thereby
16. For the text of section 101 (a) (4) see note 4 supra.
17. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
18. Id. at 78. But see Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1962) (concurring opinion).
19. 148 N.L.R.B. at 684.
20. 379 F.2d at 707. In Witmer, Civil Liberties And The Trade Union, 50 YALE
L.J. 621, 630 (1941), the author concluded:
Freedom of litigation, for instance, is hardly so essential a part of the democratic
process that the courts should be asked to strike down all hindrances to its pursuit.
The courts are as wise, to take an example of this, in adhering to the general
requirement that all available remedies within the union be exhausted before
redress is sought before them ...
21. As the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) permits union rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein, it conceivably could be argued
that a rule requiring exhaustion of intra-union remedies is not a rule with respect to
retention of membership and thus not entitled to protection under the proviso. How-
ever, this proviso has been given broad interpretation so that rules regulating strictly
internal union affairs have been given protection under the proviso even though they
did not pertain to retention of membership per se. See, e.g., Price v. NLRB, 373
F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Tawas Tube Products Case, 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965) (rules
forbidding attempt to decertify union); Russell Scofield (Wisconsin Motor case),
145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964) (rule establishing earning ceilings).
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foreclosed any possibility of unions utilizing exhaustion rules to harass
members desiring redress from the union for alleged wrongs.
Procedurally, a union member would obtain a determination of the
reasonableness of his intra-union appellate procedure by seeking an injunc-
tion in a district court, pursuant to section 102 of the Landrum-Griffin
Act,25 to enjoin enforcement of the union's exhaustion rule, alleging that
the procedure violated section 101(a) (4) of the Act. This latter section,
a part of the "Bill of Rights" for union members, guarantees the member
an opportunity to sue his union, provided, however, that he may be required
to exhaust the union's "reasonable hearing procedures. '2 6 Therefore, if
the union's procedure was unreasonable, the language of the proviso would
preclude the use of it to limit a member's access to the courts. This neces-
sarily implies that a member must have an opportunity to test the reason-
ableness of the intra-union remedy without fear of union reprisal, since,
without such opportunity, the member could conceivably be compelled to
comply with unreasonable intra-union remedies in contravention of section
101 (a) (4). Furthermore, a member would not be ignoring his union's
exhaustion rule by bringing this action since his sole purpose would be to
obtain an independent appraisal as to the reasonableness of the prescribed
exhaustion procedure.2 7
Conceivably, the Marine Workers court could have grounded its
opinion solely on an interpretation of the proviso of section 8(b) (1) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Instead, however, the court chose to render
an interpretation of the controversial proviso to section 101(a) (4) of
the Landrum-Griffin Act.28 As a result of its interpretation of this proviso,
the court concluded that the result it had reached under 8(b) (1) (A) was
the only one possible because the proviso of section 101 (a) (4) mandated
that result.2 9
25. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964) reads in part:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have
been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a
district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as
may be appropriate.
26. See note 4 supra for the text of section 101 (a) (4).
27. Section 3 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(0) (1964), states
that a person may lose membership by being "expelled or suspended from membership
after appropriate proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and
bylaws of such organization." But, if a member is expelled for bringing an action todetermine the reasonableness of the intra-union remedy, it is not, according to the
instant decision, by lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws. Therefore, the
member is wrongfully expelled from membership and remains a member in good stand-
ing and entitled to relief. See Addison v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
318 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1963). Similarly, if a union restrained or coerced a
member in some manner less drastic than expulsion, as for example, by fining the
member for initiating an action before a court or an administrative agency to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the intra-union appellate procedure, that fine would be set
aside by a court or administrative agency as a violation of the member's implied right
under section 101 (a) (4) to bring the action.
28. See generally Berchem, Labor Democracy in America: The Impact of Titles I
& IV of The Landrum-Griffin Act, 13 VILL. L. Rzv. 1, 17-26 (1967).
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The critical question under the 101 (a) (4) proviso is who may require
a union member to exhaust prescribed intra-union appellate procedures
before that member may avail himself of the processes of the courts or
an administrative agency. The landmark case interpreting this proviso
is Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists0 in which the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that this proviso was intended by Congress
to apply to courts and administrative agencies in that it was a modified
codification of the common law doctrine of exhaustion of remedies.31
The Third Circuit in the instant case specifically rejected the Detroy
court's interpretation of the 101(a) (4) proviso by stating: "We think
this construction does violence to the structure and the sense of section
101. '"2 The court concluded that the logical interpretation of the proviso
is "that a union . . . may require that the member first devote not more
than four months to reasonable grievance procedures within the
organization.
'33
Although one commentator has observed that "the legislative history
gives little guidance" in discerning the congressional intent as to the
scope of 101 (a) (4)'s proviso,34 a consideration of this history seems to
support the interpretation proffered by the court in the instant case. Prob-
ably the clearest statement of the congressional intent in enacting the
proviso was made by Senator Kennedy, 85 then the Chairman of the Con-
ference Committee, who said that the four month restriction in the
proviso relates to union-imposed restrictions rather than to those imposed
by the judiciary.3 6 Since section 101(a) (4) was primarily drafted by
the Senate,37 the Kennedy statement would seem to be a more reliable
30. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961). See p. 432
supra.
31. 286 F.2d at 78. • I,.
32. 379 F.2d at 708.
33. Id. (emphasis added), quoting from Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306
F.2d 152, 160 (3d Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion). See O'Donoghue, Protection of
a Union Member's Right to Sue Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 14 CATHOLIC U.L.
Rev. 215, 222-23 & n.34 (1965).
34. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MICH. L. Rtv. 819, 841 (1960). For a comprehensive analysis of the legislative
history of section 101(a) (4) see O'Donoghue, supra note 33 at 223-36.
35. O'Donoghue, supra note 33 at 234. See reference to Kennedy statement in
Berchem, supra note 28, at 19 n.120.
36. 105 CONG. Rxc. 17,899 (1959) (remarks by Senator Kennedy). See generally
Sherman The Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U.L. Rv. 803,818-19 (1960) ; Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
46 VA. L. RZv. 195, 206-07 (1960). But see Cox, supra note 34 at 839-41.
In the same passage Senator Kennedy indicated that the NLRB or the courts
would not be precluded from entertaining a suit by a member before the expiration
of four months. This would indicate that Congress did not wish to preclude a union
member's suit if the remedies established by the union were unreasonable. See pp.
432-33 supra.
37. O'Donoghue, supra note 33, at 234.
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source of legislative intent than the more frequently used House history,
which tends to support the interpretation rendered in Detroy.as
There is also a strong policy argument favoring the present court's
holding. The Landrum-Griffin Act was passed by Congress in order to
permit unions great latitude in handling their internal controversies8 9
with the hope of thereby obtaining greater union democracy. 40 It would
foster this congressional intent if unions established reasonable democratic
procedures to cope with internal grievance problems. The benefits derived
from such procedures within unions are numerous. As the court in the
instant case mentioned, the case load of the NLRB and the courts would
be greatly reduced if union members could reasonably obtain remedies
within their organizations.41 Also, even if the member could not adequately
settle his grievance within his union, the court or Board would obtain
valuable insight by having the issues previously reviewed by the union's
trial board.42 Finally, the aggrieved member would reap a financial benefit
if his complaint was adequately settled within his union, for he would
save the legal fees required to bring an NLRB or judicial action.43
However, it is only by the use of intra-union appellate procedures
that these benefits will be assured. As one commentator has said, "Demo-
cratic processes atrophy when they are not exercised; union members
will have no interest in improving their organizations' internal adjust-
ment procedures if they never are required to use them.144 The use of
intra-union appellate procedures is insured under the present holding,
because a member would be faced with the possibility of union sanctions
if he ignored them.45 Since, however, the member would not have to
38. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1961), quoting from 105 CONG. Rzc. App. A7,915 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1959)(remarks by Rep. Griffin), "[e]xisting decisions which require, or do not require,
exhaustion of such remedies are not to be affected except as a time limit of 4 months is
superimposed."
39. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
40. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016 (4th
Cir. 1964); Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291, 321 F.2d 801,
805 (3d Cir. 1963).
41. 379 F.2d at 707; accord, Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 414 Pa. 294, 297,
200 A.2d 306, 308 (1964).
42. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 414 Pa.
294, 297, 200 A.2d 306, 308 (1964).
43. Resort to judicial remedies is very costly to a union member. Summers, Legal
Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Rev. 1049, 1095 (1951).
44. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting And Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARY. L. Rxv. 851, 869 (1960).
45. It has been held that "a union cannot discipline its members except for offenses
stated in its constitution and by-laws. . . ." Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile
Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1965) which cited Allen v. Alliance of Moving
Picture Operators, 338 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court stated:
In determining whether discipline was properly imposed . . . any ambiguity or
uncertainty in the constitution must be construed against the union and in favor
of the member, in accordance with well established principles of documentary
construction.
Therefore, the union member will have prior notice of the consequences of his failure
to comply with a union exhaustion rule, thereby precluding an ex post facto punishment
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comply with unreasonable intra-union appellate procedures, the unions
would be forced to rectify any inequities inherent in their procedures.46
Thus, in the long run, democracy would prevail, and the member would
be assured of getting a fair hearing within his union.
Since the present decision does not entirely preclude a member's
access to an independent tribunal, it is not a complete reversal of the
idea expressed in Skura and Roberts, cases which were concerned with
protecting the union member against unreasonable restraints by his union.
Rather, it seems to be a step in the evolution of a sound labor policy,
whereby the evils of a complete denial of access to the court's processes
are eliminated, but the advantages obtained by having reasonable intra-
union appellate procedures are assured.
Edward J. Ciechon, Jr.
46. An example of a union appellate procedure amended to comply with the
Landrum-Griffin Act is presented in Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
Local 1291, 210 F. Supp. 4, 6-7 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1963).
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